{"pk":25744,"title":"Moral Reasoning as Probability Reasoning","subtitle":null,"abstract":"Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to\nchoose a deontological judgment (e.g., allowing harm)\nor a consequentialist judgment (e.g., doing harm) varied\nacross different moral dilemmas. The present paper\nexplored if the variation can be explained by the\ndifferentiation of the perceived outcome probabilities.\nWe generated moral dilemmas that were similar to the\nclassical trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and\ninvestigated the extent to which subjects were sensitive\nto the outcome probabilities. Results indicated that the\nmajority of subjects, including both those who initially\nchose a deontological decision and those who initially\nchose a consequentialist decision could be sensitive to\noutcome probabilities. The likelihood of being sensitive\nto the probabilities was invariant across different\ndilemmas. The variation of the choice behaviors across\ndifferent dilemmas might be associated with the\nvariation of the estimated outcome probabilities","language":"eng","license":{"name":"","short_name":"","text":null,"url":""},"keywords":[{"word":"probability judgment; moral reasoning;\nmoral dilemma"}],"section":"Papers","is_remote":true,"remote_url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5gn4v1fm","frozenauthors":[{"first_name":"Yijun","middle_name":"","last_name":"Shou","name_suffix":"","institution":"The Australian National University","department":""},{"first_name":"Fei","middle_name":"","last_name":"Song","name_suffix":"","institution":"The University of Hong Kong","department":""}],"date_submitted":null,"date_accepted":null,"date_published":"2015-01-01T18:00:00Z","render_galley":null,"galleys":[{"label":"PDF","type":"pdf","path":"https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/25744/galley/15368/download/"}]}