{"pk":26200,"title":"Causality, Normality, and Sampling Propensity","subtitle":null,"abstract":"We offer an account of the role of normality—both statisti-cal and prescriptive—in judgments of actual causation. Us-ing only standard tools from the literature on causal cognition,we argue that the phenomenon can be explained simply on theassumption that people stochastically sample (counterfactual)scenarios in a way that reflects normality. We show that a for-malization of this idea, giving rise to a novel measure of causalstrength, can account for some of the most puzzling qualitativepatterns uncovered in recent experimental work","language":"eng","license":{"name":"","short_name":"","text":null,"url":""},"keywords":[],"section":"Papers","is_remote":true,"remote_url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7bx507c1","frozenauthors":[{"first_name":"Thomas","middle_name":"F.","last_name":"Icard","name_suffix":"","institution":"Stanford University","department":""},{"first_name":"Joshua","middle_name":"","last_name":"Knobe","name_suffix":"","institution":"Yale University","department":""}],"date_submitted":null,"date_accepted":null,"date_published":"2016-01-01T18:00:00Z","render_galley":null,"galleys":[{"label":"PDF","type":"pdf","path":"https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/26200/galley/15836/download/"}]}