{"pk":26832,"title":"The elusive oddness of or-introduction","subtitle":null,"abstract":"The inference of or-introduction, p, therefore p or q, is\nfundamental in classical logic and probability theory. Yet\ntraditional research in the psychology of reasoning found that\npeople did not endorse this inference as highly as other one-\npremise valid inferences. A radical response to this finding is\nto claim that or-introduction is in fact invalid. This response is\nfound in the recent revision of mental model theory (MMT).\nWe argue that this revision of the theory leads to a number of\nlogical problems and counterintuitive consequences for valid\ninferences, and present an experiment extending recent\nstudies showing that people readily accept or-introduction\nunder probabilistic instructions. We argue for a pragmatic\nexplanation of why the inference is sometimes considered\nodd. The inference is not odd when people reason from their\ndegrees of belief.","language":"eng","license":{"name":"","short_name":"","text":null,"url":""},"keywords":[{"word":"or-introduction; reasoning; mental models;\nprobabilistic approach"}],"section":"Talks: Papers","is_remote":true,"remote_url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1079f1nh","frozenauthors":[{"first_name":"Nicole","middle_name":"","last_name":"Cruz","name_suffix":"","institution":"University of London","department":""},{"first_name":"David","middle_name":"","last_name":"Over","name_suffix":"","institution":"University of London","department":""},{"first_name":"Mike","middle_name":"","last_name":"Oaksford","name_suffix":"","institution":"Durham University","department":""}],"date_submitted":null,"date_accepted":null,"date_published":"2017-01-01T18:00:00Z","render_galley":null,"galleys":[{"label":"PDF","type":"pdf","path":"https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/26832/galley/16468/download/"}]}