{"pk":30904,"title":"The Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence as a Model of Human Decision Making","subtitle":null,"abstract":"Many psychology researchers have shown that humans do not process probabilistic information in a manner consistent with Bayes' theory [9, 10, 16, 24, 23, 27]. Robinson and Hastie [24, 23] showed that humans made non-compensatory probability updates, produced super-additive distributions, and resuscitated zero probability possibilities. While most researchers have classified these behaviors as nonnormative, we found that the Dempster-Shafer theory could model each of these behaviors in a normative and theoretically sound fashion. While not claiming that the theory modeb human processes, we claim that the similarities should aid user acceptance of Dempster-Shafer based decision systems.","language":"eng","license":{"name":"","short_name":"","text":null,"url":""},"keywords":[],"section":"Paper Presentations -- Group 1: Reasoning","is_remote":true,"remote_url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6m73b1hr","frozenauthors":[{"first_name":"Donald","middle_name":"H.","last_name":"Mitchell","name_suffix":"","institution":"Tulsa Research Center","department":""}],"date_submitted":null,"date_accepted":null,"date_published":"1990-01-01T18:00:00Z","render_galley":null,"galleys":[{"label":"PDF","type":"pdf","path":"https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/30904/galley/20753/download/"}]}