{"pk":31358,"title":"Projected Meaning, Grounded Meaning and Intrinsic Meaning","subtitle":null,"abstract":"It is proposed that the fundamental difference between representations whose constituent symbols have intrinsic meaning (e.g. mental representations) and those whose symbols have meanings w e consider \"projected\" (e.g. computational representations) is causal. More specifically, this distinction depends on differences in how physical change is brought about, or what w e call \"causal mechanisms\". These mechanisms serve to physically ground our intuitive notions about syntax and semantiacs.","language":"eng","license":{"name":"","short_name":"","text":null,"url":""},"keywords":[],"section":"Posters","is_remote":true,"remote_url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9rt4v5bc","frozenauthors":[{"first_name":"C.","middle_name":"Franklin","last_name":"Boyle","name_suffix":"","institution":"Carnegie Mellon University","department":""}],"date_submitted":null,"date_accepted":null,"date_published":"1992-01-01T18:00:00Z","render_galley":null,"galleys":[{"label":"PDF","type":"pdf","path":"https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/31358/galley/22427/download/"}]}