{"pk":32277,"title":"A Model Theory of Modal Reasoning","subtitle":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new theory of modal reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what may or may not be the case, and what must or must not be the case. A conclusion is possible if it holds in at least one mental model, whereas it is necessary if it holds in all the models. The theory makes a crucial prediction, which we corroborated experimentally. There is a key interaction: it is easier to infer that a situation is possible as opposed to impossible, whereas it is easier to infer that a situation is not necessary as opposed to necessary.","language":"eng","license":{"name":"","short_name":"","text":null,"url":""},"keywords":[],"section":"Long Papers","is_remote":true,"remote_url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/32d9n5j0","frozenauthors":[{"first_name":"Philip","middle_name":"N.","last_name":"Johnson-Laird","name_suffix":"","institution":"Department of Psychology, Princeton University","department":""},{"first_name":"Victoria","middle_name":"","last_name":"Bell","name_suffix":"","institution":"Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, University of Michigan","department":""}],"date_submitted":null,"date_accepted":null,"date_published":"1997-01-01T18:00:00Z","render_galley":null,"galleys":[{"label":"PDF","type":"pdf","path":"https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/32277/galley/23342/download/"}]}