

# 1 **Toward a unified approach to quantify uncertainties in sea-level projections**

2 Classification: Physical sciences – Sustainability science

3 **Gonéri Le Cozannet<sup>1</sup>, Jeremy Rohmer<sup>1</sup>, Jean-Charles Manceau<sup>1</sup>, Gael Durand<sup>2</sup>, Catherine Ritz<sup>2</sup>,**  
4 **Angélique Melet<sup>3</sup>, Benoit Meyssignac<sup>4</sup>, David Salas y Mélia<sup>5</sup>, Mark Carson<sup>6</sup>, Aimée Slangen<sup>7</sup>, Jochen**  
5 **Hinkel<sup>8,9</sup>, Erwin Lambert<sup>10</sup>, Detlef Stammer<sup>6</sup>, Roderik Van De Wal<sup>10</sup>, Robert J. Nicholls<sup>11</sup>**

6 <sup>1</sup>BRGM, 3, av. Claude Guillemin, BP 36009, 45060 Orleans Cedex 2, France, [g.lecozannet@brgm.fr](mailto:g.lecozannet@brgm.fr),  
7 +33 2 38 64 36 14 (Corresponding author)

8 <sup>2</sup>Institut des Géosciences de l'Environnement (IGE), 54 rue Molière - Domaine Universitaire - BP 96 -  
9 38402 St Martin d'Hères Cedex, France

10 <sup>3</sup>Mercator Ocean International, Parc Technologique du Canal, 8, Rue Hermès, 31520 Ramonville Saint  
11 Agne, France

12 <sup>4</sup>LEGOS - UMR 5566 | CNES - CNRS - IRD - UPS Toulouse III. 14, avenue Edouard Belin, 31400  
13 Toulouse, France.

14 <sup>5</sup>CNRM, Université de Toulouse, Météo-France, CNRS, Toulouse, France

15 <sup>6</sup>CEN, Centrum für Erdsystemforschung und Nachhaltigkeit, Universität Hamburg, Germany

16 <sup>7</sup>NIOZ, Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research, Yerseke, The Netherlands

17 <sup>8</sup>Global Climate Forum (GCF), Neue Promenade 6, 10178 Berlin, Germany

18 <sup>9</sup>Division of Resource Economics, Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institute and Berlin Workshop in Institutional  
19 Analysis of Social-Ecological Systems (WINS), Humboldt-University, Berlin

20 <sup>10</sup>Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research Utrecht, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

21 <sup>11</sup>Engineering and the Environment, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ,

22 UK

23 **Significance statement**

24 Sea level will continue to rise over the coming decades to centuries in response to climate change, and  
25 the uncertainty increases rapidly with time. The IPCC 5<sup>th</sup> assessment report concluded that the likely  
26 range of sea-level rise is between 0.52 and 0.98m by 2100 under RCP8.5. The wide range reflects  
27 various uncertainties, including a lack of evidence and consensus on the physical processes governing  
28 the contribution of ice sheet mass loss. Despite being a powerful tool for uncertainty treatment,  
29 probability remains a poor descriptor of situations encompassing such lack of knowledge. Here, we  
30 demonstrate that extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties provide a convenient framework to  
31 understand, quantify and communicate uncertainties in projected sea-level rise.

32 **Abstract**

33 Coastal impacts of climate change and the related mitigation and adaptation needs requires  
34 assessments of future sea-level changes. Following a common practice in coastal engineering,  
35 probabilistic sea-level projections have been proposed for at least 20 years. This requires a probability  
36 model to represent the uncertainties of future sea-level rise, which is not achievable because potential  
37 ice sheets mass losses remain poorly understood given the knowledge available today. Here, we apply  
38 the principles of extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties to generate global and regional sea-level  
39 projections based on uncertain components. This approach assigns an imprecision to a probabilistic  
40 measure, in order to quantify lack of knowledge pertaining to probabilistic projections. This can serve  
41 to understand, analyze and communicate uncertainties due to the coexistence of different processes  
42 contributing to future sea-level rise, including ice-sheets. We show that the knowledge gained since  
43 the 5th Assessment report of the IPCC allows better quantification of how global and regional sea-level  
44 rise uncertainties can be reduced with lower greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, Europe and  
45 Northern America are among those profiting most from a policy limiting climate change to RCP 2.6  
46 versus RCP 4.5 in terms of reducing uncertainties of sea-level rise.

47 **Keywords:** sea-level rise; projections; uncertainties; ambiguity; deep uncertainties; high-end  
48 scenarios; low-end scenarios.

49           **1. Introduction**

50   Sea level will continue to rise for years to centuries due to climate warming caused by anthropogenic  
51   greenhouse gas emissions (1-4). Global sea-level rise results from: (1) the thermal expansion of the  
52   oceans; (2) the increase of ocean mass due to the melting of mountain glaciers, and (3) mass loss from  
53   Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, as well as (4) contributions from land or ground water (1,2,5-8). In  
54   addition, there are regional sea-level rise components due to the effects of ocean circulation and the  
55   redistribution of mass, heat and salt within the ocean, atmospheric pressure (hereafter termed ocean  
56   component), as well as solid earth deformation in response to past and present mass redistributions  
57   (e.g. deglaciations) (9).

58   So far, sea-level projections have been used for a range of purposes from quantifying adaptation needs  
59   to understanding the benefits of mitigation of climate change (10-12). However, the sea-level  
60   projections available today are not well aligned with the needs of coastal adaptation practitioners (13-  
61   14). In fact, coastal adaptation practitioners and the scientific community producing sea-level  
62   information have different objectives: science aims at gaining knowledge on the physical processes  
63   causing sea-level rise, while adaptation is concerned with the resilience of society to sea-level rise and  
64   related changes. This sometimes requires consideration of the full range of sea-level rise uncertainty,  
65   including the uncertainties arising from lack of knowledge and consensus amongst experts, and this  
66   results in a wide range of projections due to the different interpretations (15-20).

67   Despite being a powerful tool for uncertainty treatment, probability remains a poor descriptor of  
68   situations characteristic by such lack of knowledge. As acknowledged by the sea-level science  
69   community itself, no single probability model can yet be recommended (7,21,22). Extra-probabilistic  
70   theories of uncertainty are well suited to quantify uncertainties in sea-level projections because they  
71   recognize that several probability functions are consistent with the knowledge available (23-26) (see  
72   methods). As a general principle, extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties consider that

73 probabilistic measures are themselves uncertain and assign an imprecision to this measure (24,27,28).

74 This allows consideration of the uncertainties pertaining to the probabilistic projections (29,30).

75 In this paper, we apply the principles of extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties across the different  
76 steps allowing the generation of global and regional sea-level projections based on uncertain  
77 components (See methods and section 2). We use a procedure for jointly propagating uncertain  
78 components represented by probabilistic and extra-probabilistic distributions and for addressing the  
79 issue of dependencies between components (see methods). We apply the approach to the AR5 likely  
80 components, but we also examine post-AR5 studies on ice sheet melting (31-33). Our aim is to provide  
81 a complementary approach to deal with uncertainties in sea-level projections, especially with regard  
82 to the needs of the most risk-averse stakeholders (11-14). Many issues discussed in this paper have  
83 been already identified in previous studies (7,18-22,29,30). Here, the novelty of our approach consists  
84 of applying a mathematical framework that provides quantitative insight into concepts expressed in  
85 fuzzy terms so far, such as ambiguity, high-end scenarios and deep uncertainties.

86 This paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we model the uncertainties of sea-level components in an  
87 extra-probabilistic framework, focusing in particular on ice-sheets melting. In section 3, we provide  
88 extra-probabilistic sea-level projections and examine how they can be used to deliver quantitative  
89 measures for uncertainties in a consistent manner across regions, time horizons and climate scenarios.  
90 Finally, section 4 examines the global and regional dependency of extraprobabilistic sea-level  
91 projections on greenhouse gas emissions.

## 92 **2. Modelling uncertainties in sea-level components**

### 93 **2.1 Sources of ambiguity in sea-level projections**

94 After Kopp et al. (2017) (7), and the earlier study of Ellsberg, 1961 (34), the term 'ambiguity' is defined  
95 as the uncertainty due to the coexistence of several equally credible probability functions to describe  
96 a variable, such as future global sea-level rise. The dynamic mass discharge of the Antarctic ice sheet  
97 is the most obvious, but not the only, source of ambiguity in sea-level projections (Supplementary

98 Figure 1). In fact, two distinct processes causing dynamic mass loss of the ice sheet are currently  
99 considered: (1) marine ice sheet instability (MISI), which possibly explains observations in West-  
100 Antarctica (**35,36**) and could contribute to global sea-level rise of up to 0.3m by 2100 (**3,32**), and (2)  
101 the marine ice cliffs instabilities (MICI), which involves a rapid retreat of ice shelves in response to a  
102 combined effect of hydro-fracturing and dislocation of ice cliffs formed at the ice sheet margins (**33**).  
103 This latter process is observed in very limited regions of Greenland and Antarctica, and it requires  
104 substantial ice melt at the surface, which may not happen in Antarctica over the 21<sup>st</sup> century (**37**).  
105 Furthermore, the process itself is poorly understood from a physical point of view and is therefore  
106 heavily parametrized in models. However, MICI is associated with large ice loss in Antarctica and it  
107 could cause 1 m of global sea-level rise by 2100 (**33**) (Supplementary Figure 1). Today, the probability  
108 of MICI is unknown, but as it is considered possible, sea-level projections assuming MICI provide  
109 relevant information for risk-averse coastal adaptation practitioners. Hence, two families of  
110 probabilistic projections coexist today for the Antarctic dynamic contribution to sea-level rise: those  
111 compliant with the 5<sup>th</sup> assessment report (AR5) of the IPCC, whether involving MISI or not, and those  
112 also involving MICI (**38**) (Supplementary Figure 1).

113 Coupled ice-sheet projections combining the rapid dynamics and surface mass balance (difference  
114 between snow accumulation and the melt and sublimation of snow and ice) of the Greenland ice sheet  
115 (GIS) are provided in a probabilistic form based on a suite of climate models (**31**). Over the last two  
116 decades, global climate models underestimate the contribution of the Greenland ice sheet surface  
117 mass balance to global sea-level rise by a factor of two (**39-41**). Future observations and research  
118 should establish whether this discrepancy is due to multi-decadal modes of Greenland climate  
119 variability, or if higher resolution climate model capture atmospheric changes sufficiently well to  
120 reconcile observed or modelled Greenland ice sheet surface mass balance. Until this is resolved, sea-  
121 level projections should consider the possibility that this bias remains in the future, leading to  
122 Greenland ice sheet contributions to sea-level rise equal to twice the probabilistic assessment of Fürst  
123 et al. (2015) (**31**) (Supplementary Figure 2).

124 Other sources of ambiguity include Antarctic surface mass balance (42-44), glacier melting (45-49), and  
125 groundwater extraction (Supplementary Figure 3; Supplementary Table 1). Here, we rely on the AR5  
126 statement (1), which provides likely ranges for all these components without delivering upper and  
127 lower bounds. Hence, following the approach of Le Cozannet et al. (2017) (30), we complete possibility  
128 distributions fitted to the AR5 likely ranges with upper and lower bounds available in the literature  
129 (see supplementary Table 1).

130 We assume that the ocean component can be described by a Gaussian distribution across the 21 CMIP5  
131 models (16 for RCP 2.6) used in sea-level projections after Slangen et al. (2014) (6) and Carson et al.  
132 (2016) (8). This Gaussian assumption has been evaluated by Jackson and Jevrejeva (2016) (50) using a  
133 larger model ensemble. They concluded that the distribution of the ocean component across models  
134 was Gaussian (if some outliers were removed, especially in the tropics and the Mediterranean).  
135 However, this Gaussian assumption could be questioned in future studies, considering dependences  
136 between CMIP5 models, the limitations due to the small number of CMIP5 models (16 to 21), and,  
137 ultimately, the processes included in each models, which may perform differently depending on the  
138 region considered (51,52). The same caveat applies to the effects of the global isostatic adjustment  
139 (GIA), which can display large uncertainties locally (53). However, there is currently little basis to bound  
140 vertical ground motions due to the GIA, so that we follow here the AR5 approach (1), which arguably  
141 interpret the difference between two GIA models as the standard deviation of a Gaussian distribution  
142 (1,54,55). While it is too early to model the ocean and GIA contributions through appropriate extra-  
143 probabilistic distribution, our assumptions can be justified because ice mass losses are the dominant  
144 source of ambiguity in sea-level projections and most important to consider.

## 145 2.2 Experimental design

146 The extra-probabilistic sea-level projections presented in Figure 1 (and in all other figures of this paper)  
147 are computed by a Monte-Carlo procedure jointly propagating uncertain components represented by  
148 probabilistic and extra-probabilistic distributions (Supplementary Figure 3) (24) (see methods). To

149 evaluate the knowledge gained since the AR5, we consider the two following groups of extra-  
150 probabilistic projections:


- 151 - Alter-AR5 global mean sea-level projections, which sum the Gaussian ocean sea-level  
152 component with extra-probabilistic ice and land water components adjusted to the AR5 likely  
153 ranges (1), while remaining bounded by minimum and maximum possible contributions  
154 (50,56-58) (supplementary Table 1). We call them Alter-AR5 because they are computed  
155 based on an extra-probabilistic approach to the AR5 likely ranges of sea-level components  
156 (Methods).
- 157 - Post-AR5 projections, which consider the recent advances regarding the simulation of  
158 Antarctic dynamics and Greenland ice sheet melting (31-33).

159 In a probabilistic framework, assumptions regarding the dependencies of components of sea-level rise  
160 have large impacts on the final distribution (59). Here, our reference set of simulations assumes full  
161 dependency between the ocean, glacier, Greenland, and Antarctic surface mass balance components  
162 through their relation to global mean surface temperature. We assume that the Antarctic surface mass  
163 balance is anticorrelated with the other components, because it is expected that more precipitation  
164 will accumulate on the margins of Antarctica in a warmer climate, thus reducing global sea-level rise.  
165 Other dependence schemes are tested (supplementary table 1) and presented in the supplementary  
166 figures.

### 167 3. Results: extra probabilistic sea-level projections and quantitative metrics of uncertainty

168 Figure 1 displays extra-probabilistic global sea-level projections by 2100 under RCP 8.5 in a cumulative  
169 distribution diagram. These sea-level rise projections are bounded by two functions, the upper and  
170 lower cumulative probability bounds, hence defining a probability-box (p-box), which includes all  
171 probabilistic projection compliant with our assumptions. The “ill-known” sea-level rise cumulative  
172 distribution function by 2100 under RCP 8.5 is located in between these two bounds, which are  
173 computed according to the joint probabilistic-extra-probabilistic procedure described in the methods

174 section. The ambiguity in global sea-level projection can therefore be appraised by comparing these  
 175 upper and lower bounds, but it may also be quantified simply by computing the area comprised  
 176 between these two functions. This region is called the “Ambiguity area criterion” (AAC) in the  
 177 remainder of this paper.



178

179 **Figure 1: Global extra-probabilistic sea-level projection for 2100 (RCP 8.5) presented in a cumulative**  
 180 **distribution diagram, and proposing unified criteria to identify deeply uncertain sea-level values or**  
 181 **low-end and high-end scenarios. The projection presented here corresponds to post-AR5**  
 182 **simulations.**

183 Coastal adaptation practitioners can refer to cumulative distribution diagrams such as Figure 1 in order  
 184 to appraise the safety margin provided by the sea-level scenarios they are using and define:

- 185 - deeply uncertain sea-level scenarios, corresponding to sea-level rise values, whose probability
- 186 can not be quantified precisely enough to inform adaptation, due to high disagreements

187 between possible probabilistic models. For example, in Figure 1, values are considered deeply  
188 uncertain if the uncertainty of their probability exceeds 60%.

189 - high-end and low-end scenarios, whose probabilities can be bounded. For example, Figure 1  
190 defines high-end (respectively low-end) scenarios as sea-level rise values, whose probabilities  
191 is lower than a user-defined risk tolerance threshold, set at 60% in Figure 1. Hence, in Figure  
192 1, low-end scenarios correspond to future sea levels whose probabilities to be exceeded can  
193 not exceed 60%.

194 - lower and upper bounds, corresponding to sea-level scenarios, whose probability is extremely  
195 low whatever the probabilistic frameworks considered. In the example of Figure 1, this  
196 corresponds to sea-level rise values lower than 0m and higher than 3m, whose probabilities  
197 are always lower than 1%. While there is no physical basis to support sea-level scenarios in this  
198 range today, users with high risk-aversion, such as those planning the maintenance and  
199 decommissioning of nuclear power plants, may still consider such lower and upper bound in  
200 their adaptation strategy, for example to align their sea-level scenarios with the safety margins  
201 applicable in their working processes, or at least have a strategy in place if these scenarios are  
202 praised.

203 Depending on their risk-aversion, users can define risk tolerance thresholds to distinguish high-end  
204 and low-end scenarios from deeply uncertain sea-level rise values (**11-14**). This threshold can be  
205 associated to an uncertainty on the cumulative probability function. In the remainder of this paper,  
206 thresholds ranging from 1% to 10% are presented.

207 AR5 authors did not provide any very likely range of future sea level (90-100% probability), because of  
208 the lack of literature and understanding on the very unlikely high-end values of projected temperatures  
209 and sea-level components. Here, Figure 1 proposes a framework applicable at any location and  
210 allowing coastal adaptation practitioners to define the most appropriate sea-level scenario given their  
211 decision context (**11-14**). Furthermore, the terminology proposed here has the advantage of defining

212 precisely concepts, which have previously been loosely defined so far, such as ambiguity, deep  
213 uncertainties, high-end scenarios and upper bounds.

#### 214 **4. Discussion: dependency of extra-probabilistic sea-level projections on greenhouse gas** 215 **emissions**

##### 216 4.1 Changes in global sea-level projections since the AR5


217 In this subsection, we examine how the knowledge gained since AR5 has modified global sea-level  
218 projections that can be obtained through an extra-probabilistic approach. The gray and red polygons  
219 in Figure 2 present the upper and lower cumulative distribution functions for Alter-AR5 and Post-AR5  
220 simulations for RCP 8.5 in 2100 (supplementary table 1). Note that the shape of the Alter-AR5 upper  
221 distribution can be explained by the high uncertainty of the upper bound of the contribution of  
222 Antarctic ice sheet and by the dependence scheme used here (see section 2 and supplementary  
223 material 3). In fact, considering different dependence schemes leads to qualitatively similar results,  
224 although Alter-AR5 simulations are more sensitive to assumptions regarding dependencies. This can  
225 be explained by the long fat tails of probability boxes associated with the likely ranges (30), which  
226 remain more apparent in global projections when stronger dependencies between components are  
227 assumed. However, in the case of Post-AR5 simulations, these choices have only a minor impact on  
228 the uncertainties of extra-probabilistic sea-level projections (Supplementary Figure 4).

229 Different perspectives can be taken to compare uncertainties in sea-level projections. For example,  
230 the AR5 statement implies that the probability that sea-level rise exceeds 1.5m by 2100 is lower than  
231 33%, but Figure 2 shows that it is lower than 55% according to the Alt-AR5 simulations, and lower than  
232 90% according to the post-AR5 simulations. This illustrates that the uncertainties in sea-level  
233 projections depend heavily on the uncertainty model chosen for each sea-level component, as well as  
234 on the method chosen to aggregate uncertainties of individual sea-level components. Overall, if sea-  
235 level rise values higher than 2m are left aside, post-AR5 simulations are shifted to the right in a CDF

236 diagram compared to previous estimates, implying larger deeply uncertain and greater high-end sea-  
237 level scenarios.

238 The ambiguity criterion of global sea-level projections, as defined in Figure 1, is 8% larger in post-AR5  
239 projections than for alter-AR5 projections for RCP8.5. However, it is reduced by 40% and 60% for RCP  
240 4.5 and 2.6 respectively (Supplementary Figure 5). These examples show in a quantitative manner that  
241 the ambiguity of sea-level projections by 2100 is much smaller for lower RCP scenarios in post-AR5  
242 simulations (as expressed by Horton et al., 2018 (**22**)). Furthermore, it shows that for RCP 8.5, the  
243 knowledge gained since AR5 has neither resulted in a reduction of ambiguity of sea-level projections,  
244 nor in allowing coastal adaptation planners to reduce the range of plausible sea-level scenarios. Hence,  
245 when designing sea-level scenarios, coastal adaptation practitioners should not necessarily expect a  
246 reduction of uncertainties with the acquisition of new knowledge. Instead, they may anticipate that  
247 upper and lower cumulative bounds will continue to evolve in the future.

248 The results presented in Figure 2 are sensitive to outliers and extreme modeling results. For example,  
249 Post-AR5 sea-level projections strongly rely on a single study implementing the Marine Ice Cliff  
250 Instability (**33**), and, to a smaller extent, to current capabilities of Greenland ice-sheet melting models  
251 (see section 2). Nevertheless, Alter-AR5 simulations shown in Figure 2 remind that sea-level  
252 projections displayed ambiguity before this particular study. Whatever the limitations of each single  
253 study considered here, the uncertainty propagation procedure (Methods) guarantees that no line of  
254 evidence in the published literature supports any probabilistic sea-level projection outside the colored  
255 area in Figure 2.



256


257 **Figure 2: Extra-probabilistic sea-level projections based on Alter-AR5 and Post-AR5 simulations.**  
 258 **Supplementary figure 5 provides the same results for RCP 4.5 and RCP 2.6 by 2100, and**  
 259 **supplementary figure 6 for all RCP by 2055.**

260

261 4.2 Regional implications

262 The ambiguity of sea-level rise displays regional variability due to the non-uniform response of the  
 263 solid Earth to the melting of ice (Figure 3) (2,6,7). This reflects that ambiguity is mostly due to dynamic  
 264 mass loss from the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets. Contrary to the global mean (Figures 1 and 2),  
 265 the sea-level projections presented in Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure 7 are applicable at regional  
 266 scales and can be combined with information on local vertical ground motions, sea-level variability and  
 267 extreme water levels in order to create local relative sea-level rise scenarios suitable to inform

268 adaptation. They provide a baseline for coastal adaptation practitioners to design locally applicable  
269 extra-probabilistic projections as well as high-end and low-end scenarios as in Figure 1.




270  
271 **Figure 3: Regional variability of AAC (ambiguity area criterion) in the case of post-AR5 simulations.**  
272 **The AAC is expressed as a percentage of the global mean. Projections provided are for 2100 with**  
273 **respect to a 1986-2005 mean.**


274 Figure 4 displays the benefits, in terms of ambiguity reduction, of achieving RCP 2.6 and RCP 4.5  
275 compared to a RCP 8.5 baseline, which is assumed to represent business-as-usual greenhouse gas  
276 emissions. Figure 4 shows that mitigating climate change reduces the ambiguity in sea-level projections  
277 in almost all inhabited regions. However, while climate change mitigation reduces sea-level projection  
278 ambiguity almost uniformly along inhabited coastlines of the world if RCP 4.5 is achieved, reaching the  
279 more ambitious RCP2.6 benefits the countries of the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and eastern  
280 Mediterranean, northern Europe, the west coast of North America, around the Yellow Sea, and the  
281 Arctic the most. More generally, Europe and all of North America see higher benefits. This is due to  
282 the fact that RCP4.5 strongly reduces the risk of a large contribution from the Greenland ice sheet  
283 (Supplementary Figure 2) (31), whereas the projections of dynamics ice sheets melting in Antarctica  
284 are significantly lower for RCP 2.6 compared to RCP 4.5 (Supplementary Figure 1). This reduction of

285 ambiguity has obvious implications for adaptation in these areas, as the lower ambiguity simplifies the  
286 process of selecting appropriate sea-level scenarios for planning and design: e.g., design height  
287 standards or setback lines for coastal infrastructures. For mitigation policies, this implies that western  
288 countries are among those who benefit the most from reducing climate change well below current  
289 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). As these countries have established a global  
290 economy based on the combustion of fossil fuels and remain massive contributors to today's  
291 greenhouse gas emissions, the result of Figure 4 can be seen as an additional incentive for finding  
292 mitigation solutions allowing to reach the 2°C target.

293 The contribution of the different sea-level components to the ambiguity of regional and global sea-  
294 level projections is closely related to the diversity in and the amount of studies on these components.  
295 Since AR5, a lot of effort has been dedicated to studies on the contribution of Antarctica to global sea-  
296 level rise (7,50,58,60,61). This has led to estimates based on a diverse range of methods from process-  
297 based statistical estimates (32) to numerical simulations with recently developed parametrizations  
298 (33). In contrast, the contribution of thermal expansion is directly derived from the CMIP5 simulations,  
299 which are all coupled Atmosphere-Ocean Global Circulation Models (AOGCMs). There are no new  
300 estimates of thermal expansion based on global warming including plausible feedback processes,  
301 which are not represented in AOGCMs. In addition, there are no post-AR5 estimates of thermal  
302 expansion. Altogether, the diversity of approaches to estimate the contributions of different  
303 components to sea-level rise may exacerbate the large dependency of ambiguity to specific  
304 components such as Antarctica.



305



306

307 **Figure 4: regional reduction of ambiguity in sea-level projections by 2100 induced by climate change**  
 308 **mitigation policies according to the ambiguity area criterion (see section 3.3): above RCP 2.6 versus**  
 309 **RCP8.5; below: RCP 4.5 versus RCP 8.5 (note difference in scales in the two figures). These figures**  
 310 **read as follows: the ambiguity in sea-level projections are reduced by a factor 4 (respectively 2) along**

311 **the coasts of Africa if RCP 2.6 (respectively: RCP 4.5) is preferred to the business-as-usual scenario**  
312 **(RCP 8.5).**

## 313 **5. Conclusions**

314 This study applies the principle of extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties across the different steps  
315 leading to global and regional sea-level projections based on their components. From a methodological  
316 point of view, we provide a consistent and unified framework to quantify ambiguity, deep uncertainties  
317 and define high-end and low-end scenarios across many coastal locations, thus providing directly  
318 applicable projections to inform coastal adaptation planners (section 3).

319 The analysis shows a strong relationship between quantitative measures of ambiguity and RCP  
320 scenarios. This emphasizes the strong dependency of sea-level projections on greenhouse gas  
321 emissions, which is less apparent if only one probabilistic sea-level projection is considered.  
322 Furthermore, this enables the benefit, in terms of ambiguity reduction, of achieving RCP2.6 or RCP4.5  
323 versus RCP8.5 to be quantified. We find that developed countries are among those who benefit the  
324 most, in terms of such uncertainty reduction. This is one benefit of climate mitigation that is rarely  
325 considered.

326 Our conclusions rely on the current state of understanding of each component of sea-level rise. This  
327 state of understanding is evolving over time. For example, future studies may conclude that the Marine  
328 Ice Cliff Instability is unlikely to occur during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Overall, and notwithstanding limitations  
329 of our ability to define uncertain components of future sea-level rise, the extra-probabilistic approach  
330 can be seen as an attempt to address the needs of users considering likely estimates and low-  
331 probability high-impact scenarios within a unified framework.

## 332 **6. Methods**

### 333 **6.1 Sources of ambiguity in sea-level projections**

334 We apply the principles of extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties, which use imprecise probability  
335 functions to extract quantitative metrics of ambiguity. Depending on the source of information

336 describing uncertainties for each component, we apply the most appropriate mode of representation:  
337 possibility distributions (62) or probability boxes (63) constructed based on the maximum and  
338 minimum CDF available in the literature, or probability functions.

339 The AR5 provides likely intervals, within which the considered variable is expected to lie with a  
340 probability higher than 2/3 (table 1 of Mastrandrea et al., 2010 (64), see supplementary text 1). Given  
341 a likely range, the probability of exceeding a particular threshold is bounded by two step functions,  
342 which delineate all plausible probability functions compliant with this likely range (30). We  
343 complement the likely range with supplementary information that allows bounds to the maximum  
344 contribution of each component of sea-level rise to be estimated, mostly from Jackson and Jevrejeva  
345 (2016) (50). For example, the sea-level rise contribution from Greenland cannot exceed 5m, which  
346 corresponds to the total amount of sea-level equivalent in this ice sheet. By 2100, these figures are  
347 further limited by the kinematics of ice melting processes (56). Supplementary Table 1 indicates which  
348 assumptions have been made for each component of future sea-level rise (see supplementary table  
349 1).

## 350 6.2 Joint probabilistic-extra-probabilistic propagation of uncertainties

351 Uncertainty propagation consists of evaluating the impacts of the uncertainties associated with the  
352 inputs of a model on the outputs of interest. Here, the model of interest computes global and regional  
353 sea-level projections. It is simply the sum of the uncertainty components of future sea-level rise,  
354 considering the dependencies between these components. We apply a Monte-Carlo-like approach,  
355 namely the independent random set approach (65), to jointly propagate uncertainties of probabilistic  
356 and extra-probabilistic input parameters across the model. This method extends the classic  
357 probabilistic Monte-Carlo approach by selecting an interval for each probability of exceedance level  
358 instead of a single value. The method accounts for stochastic dependencies and anti-dependencies  
359 among input parameters: during each step of the propagation procedure, we select the same levels of

360 probability of exceedance for two fully dependent variables, or the complement of this probability of  
361 exceedance for an anti-dependent variable (in the case of Antarctic surface mass balance).

### 362 6.3 Regional projections

363 The regional projections are computed following Slangen et al. (2014) (6): for each 1°x1° cell in the  
364 ocean: we apply the same Joint probabilistic-extra-probabilistic propagation of uncertainties,  
365 considering the regional variability of the ocean component as well as the fingerprints of mass  
366 contributions to sea-level rise. Finally, the contribution of the global isostatic adjustment is added as a  
367 Gaussian contribution, as in the AR5. Other vertical ground motions caused by anthropogenic or  
368 natural processes (tectonics, volcanism, variations in the water content in recent sedimentary layers,  
369 groundwater or hydrocarbure extractions, etc.) (11, 66) are not considered, and, where relevant,  
370 should be added as an additional source of uncertainty for local application.

### 371 6.4 Implementation

372 We use the R-package Hyrisk (Hybrid Methods for Addressing Uncertainty in RISK Assessments) (67),  
373 supplemented with additional functions allowing the inclusion of p-boxes as uncertainty input  
374 parameters. We obtain the regional extra-probabilistic projections by performing 250 simulations in  
375 the Monte-Carlo procedure. We forced the input random variable to follow a Sobol' sequence of quasi-  
376 random numbers (68) in order to accelerate the convergence of the computation of the extra-  
377 probabilistic projections.

### 378 **Authors contributions**

379 GLC Designed research; all authors performed research; JCM, JR Contributed new analytic tools; MC,  
380 AS, DS provided data; All analyzed results, wrote and revised the paper.

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**Supplementary material**

544

545 Supplementary table 1: summary of Alter-AR5 and Post-AR5 simulations presented in this study. We


546 use the posterior simulations of Ritz et al. (2015) (32). We use the worst-case simulations in DeConto

547 and Pollard (2016) (33).

	<b>Alter-AR5 – 2055</b>	<b>Alter-AR5 - 2100</b>	<b>Post AR5 - 2100</b>
Thermal expansion	Gaussian distribution		
Greenland ice sheet	AR5 likely range, bounded by the maximum and minimum values provided by Jackson and Jevrejeva (2016) (50)		See Supp. Fig 2
Glaciers	AR5 likely range, bounded by the maximum and minimum values provided by Jackson and Jevrejeva (2016) (50)		
Antarctic surface mass balance			
Antarctic dynamics	AR5 likely range, bounded by the maximum and minimum values provided by Jackson and Jevrejeva (2016) (50)		See Supp Fig 1. Lower CDF: Ritz et al. (2015) (32) Upper CDF: RCP 8.5 and 4.5: DeConto and Pollard (2016) (33); RCP 2.6: Ritz et al., (2015) (32)
Groundwater	AR5 likely range, bounded by the maximum and minimum values provided by Jackson and Jevrejeva (2016) (50)		
Global isostatic adjustment (regional simulations only)	Gaussian distribution with mean and standard deviations equal to the mean and difference of the Lambeck and Peltier global GIA models, as in the AR5 regional simulations (1)		
Reference dependence scheme	Ocean, glaciers and ice sheets surface mass balance, considering accumulation of snow over Antarctica in a warmer climate.		
Other dependence scheme tested	No dependencies	Fully independent	


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552 Supplementary Figure 1. Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) representing the contribution of  
 553 Antarctic dynamics, according to Ritz et al. (2015) (32) and DeConto and Pollard (2016) (33). Note that  
 554 the latter CDF are conditional to greenhouse gas emissions (RCP scenarios), whereas only the initiation  
 555 of the melting in each sector depends on greenhouse gas emissions in Ritz et al. (2015) (32). Hence,  
 556 this probabilistic statement is largely independent of any climate change scenario. Note that the  
 557 probabilistic projection of Ritz et al. (2015) (32) displayed here considers observations. The CDF  
 558 provided by DeConto and Pollard (2016) (33) include both Antarctic dynamics and surface mass  
 559 balance. The latter contribution is removed here (-0.019m, -0.047m and -0.075m for RCP 2.6, 4.5 and  
 560 8.5, respectively). The white area represent the p-box considered here in the Alter-AR5 simulations  
 561 (30). It is based on: (1) the likely range of the IPCC (white and dashed gray areas), which is the same  
 562 for all RCP scenarios; (2) information on the maximum and minimum possible contributions of  
 563 Antarctica according to Jackson and Jevrejeva (2016) (dashed gray areas). For the translation of a likely  
 564 range in a CDF diagram, see Le Cozannet et al. (2017) (30).



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
567 Supplementary Figure 2. Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) representing the contribution of  
 568 Greenland, according to Frst et al. (2015) (31), and considering a scenario where the contribution of  
 569 Greenland is twice that of Frst et al 2015 (31). The white area represents the p-box considered in the  
 570 Alter-AR5 simulations (see legend of supplementary Figure 1). It is based on the fusion of likely ranges  
 571 in the IPCC AR5 for all RCP scenarios (white and dashed gray areas). The dashed gray areas are excluded  
 572 based on Jackson and Jevrejeva (2016) (50).

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
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
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578 Supplementary Figure 3: mixed probabilistic / extra-probabilistic input parameters used here to  
 579 compute global and regional sea-level changes in the case of the RCP 8.5 Alter-AR5 (top) and Post-AR5  
 580 (bottom) simulations by 2100. All parameters are shown in a CDF diagram (cumulative density function  
 581 or p-boxes).

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


583  
 584 Supplementary Figure 4: impact of other dependence schemes. The white area represents the p-box  
 585 implied by the AR5 likely range (30). This figure illustrates that for Post-AR5 simulations and, to a lesser  
 586 extent, for Alter-AR5 simulation, considering different dependence schemes has only a small effect on  
 587 the upper and lower cumulative probability bounds, and is a negligible source of uncertainties given  
 588 the large ambiguity in sea-level projections. Hence, with the current ambiguity in sea-level projections,  
 589 considering different dependence schemes is not necessary.



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
591 Supplementary Figure 5: global extra-probabilistic sea-level projections obtained for each climate  
 592 change scenario (RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 8.5) based on the IPCC statement on components, for both Alter-  
 593 AR5 and Post-AR5 simulations. The white area represents the p-box implied by the AR5 likely ranges  
 594 (30).



595

596 Supplementary figure 6: global extra-probabilistic projections by 2055. The white area is the fusion of  
 597 the likely ranges of all three scenarios RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 8.5. This figure shows that there is consistency  
 598 in the mixed probabilistic/extra-probabilistic frameworks proposed here and those applied in the  
 599 IPCC AR5 by 2055, translating the fact that the ocean component of sea-level rise (considered  
 600 Gaussian in both cases) is a major contribution to uncertainties by this time horizon.

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603 Supplementary figure 7: regional extra-probabilistic projections displaying regional lowest and highest  
 604 scenarios (1% tolerance threshold) as well as lower and upper bounds of deep uncertainties (10%  
 605 tolerance threshold). There is no physical basis to support sea-level scenarios outside the minimum  
 606 and maximum values, but users may select scenarios outside this range if this is aligned with the  
 607 security margins applicable in their sectors (see definitions in Figure 1 ; maps are smoothed with a  
 608 5°x5° mean filter).

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## 617 **Supplementary text 1: uncertainty frameworks applicable to sea-level projections**

### 618 S.1 Probabilistic sea-level projections

619 In the area of coastal engineering, probabilities are the most widely used tool to describe uncertainties.  
620 For example, in France, coastal risk prevention plans prepare for flooding events with probabilities of  
621 exceedance of 1/100 per year, whereas the newly proposed highest protection standards in the  
622 Netherlands consider dike failure probabilities ranging from 1/10,000 to 1/100,000 in coastal areas (i).  
623 Probabilistic sea-level projections provide a probability function representing the uncertainties of  
624 future sea levels at particular time horizons (e.g., 2050, 2100). They are commonly (but not always)  
625 produced by propagating uncertainties of each component of sea-level rise by means of a Monte Carlo  
626 approaches (2,10,50,60,ii).

### 627 S.2 Reasons for considering other frameworks to represent uncertainties

628 While probabilities are very widely used to represent sea-level uncertainty, it is questionable if these  
629 are the right tool for supporting coastal practitioners, because sea-level rise projections are  
630 ambiguous: several probabilistic sea-level projections exist, reflecting different assumptions on the  
631 causes of future sea-level rise, and, as acknowledged by the sea-level science community itself  
632 (7,21,22), no single probability model can be recommended yet to support coastal adaptation  
633 practitioners. The coexistence of different but equally credible probabilistic statements in future sea-  
634 level changes defines the concept of “ambiguity of sea-level projections” (7), following the original  
635 work of Ellsberg (1961) (34) on risk and decision making).

### 636 S.3 extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties and their application to sea-level projections

637 Extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties are well suited to analyze ambiguity in sea-level  
638 projections because they recognize that several probability functions are compliant with the  
639 knowledge available (23-26) (see methods). As a general principle, extra-probabilistic theories of

640 uncertainties consider that probabilistic measures are themselves uncertain, and assign an imprecision  
641 to this measure (24,27,28).

642 In the area of sea-level rise, at least two extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties, the theory of  
643 evidence (iii) and the possibility theory (62), have been used by coastal engineers and scientists. The  
644 purpose of these studies was to represent the ambiguity due to conflicting expert elicitations of sea-  
645 level rise (29,30), to propagate uncertainties through coastal impact models, or to perform a sensitivity  
646 analysis.

#### 647 S.4 Use of extra-probabilistic theories of uncertainties in the IPCC reports

648 The IPCC recommended using fuzzy boundaries to define likelihood statements (64), where the current  
649 state of knowledge prevents reliance on a single probability function (64). For example, in the 5<sup>th</sup>  
650 Assessment report (AR5) of the IPCC, uncertainties in sea-level projections are provided in the form of  
651 a likely range (1). According to the definition, the probability that future sea-level rise falls within the  
652 *likely* range is between 66% and 100% (64), so that the probability of exceeding the upper limit of the  
653 likely range (e.g., 0.98m by 2100 in the RCP 8.5 scenario) could be 0 to 33% (20,30). As per its definition  
654 (Mastrandrea et al., 2010), a *likely* range can be immediately interpreted within an extra-probabilistic  
655 framework, such as probability bound analysis (63), within which any cumulative distribution  
656 consistent with the knowledge available are bounded by an upper and lower probability distribution.

657 In AR5, however, the extra-probabilistic approach was not applied across all steps of producing global  
658 and regional sea-level projections. The likely ranges of independent contributions of components of  
659 future sea-level rise were summed quadratically, reflecting a slightly different definition of the likely  
660 range (“approximately 66%”, as in Church et al., 2013 (iv)), and a probabilistic propagation of  
661 uncertainties assuming Gaussian distributions. Consequently, the spread of the likely range of global  
662 sea-level rise was set to 0.52-0.98m by 2100 in the AR5, to be compared with a likely range of 0.3-1.3m  
663 that would result if no assumption is made regarding the shape of the distributions and their  
664 interdependence, and likely intervals are therefore simply added. This approach separates the

665 (probabilistic) propagation of uncertainties from the final assessment, provided in extra-probabilistic  
666 terms (**v**), but the issue remains that the choice of a particular uncertainty framework has large impacts  
667 on the final uncertainty range conveyed to coastal stakeholders.

668 **Supplementary references:**

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