

High Awareness, Limited Action: Explaining Attitudinal Barriers to Climate Mitigation in Academia

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Abstract

General support for climate action is widely expressed within academia and public research, with surveys consistently reporting exceptionally high levels of awareness and concern about the climate crisis. Yet, the implementation of mitigation policies in universities and research institutions remains limited.

Drawing on a national survey of 4,688 academics and research personnel in France, we examine this apparent paradox and find that more than half express attitudinal barriers to climate action, including reluctance toward the inclusion of academia in mitigation efforts, opposition to institutional mitigation policies, and inconsistencies between stated support for mitigation and willingness to adopt corresponding changes in individual research practices.

Higher perceived costs of academic mitigation actions—particularly their potential impacts on competitiveness and scientific visibility—are consistently associated with these barriers, along with lower agreement with de-growth as a response to environmental challenges. Such barriers are also more prevalent among senior male scientists with higher levels of mobility, particularly in physics, chemistry, and medical and health sciences.

Academia provides a critical context to examine how climate inaction can persist in the near absence of climate denial. Our findings suggest that moving from stated commitments to effective action requires addressing how

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33 climate policies interact with academic hierarchies and dominant models of
34 productivity and recognition—an issue with direct implications for the design
35 of mitigation policies within research institutions.

36 *Keywords:* Academic carbon footprint, Global Warming, Ecological
37 transition, Climate delay discourses

38 1. Introduction

39 Calls for academia to align its practices with climate goals—or even
40 to lead by example—have intensified over the past decade ([Kreil, 2021b](#);
41 [Kanashiro et al., 2020](#); [Higham and Font, 2020](#); [Le Quéré et al., 2015](#); [Serrano-
42 Plana, 2025](#)). In response to these calls, scientists and academics have started
43 to assess the weight and distribution of the carbon footprint of scientific activ-
44 ities ([Ben-Ari, 2023](#); [Dotti et al., 2025](#); [Mariette et al., 2022](#)) and to conduct
45 quantitative and qualitative surveys to understand their determinants ([Tseng
46 et al., 2022a](#); [Latter et al., 2024](#); [Whitmarsh et al., 2020](#); [Higham et al., 2019](#);
47 [Blanchard et al., 2022b](#)).

48 In countries with a relatively decarbonized electricity mix, studies show
49 that routine research emissions are primarily driven by scope 3 GHG sources
50 such as the purchase of equipment, materials, and services required for scien-
51 tific activity ([Ben-Ari, 2023](#); [De Paepe et al., 2024](#); [Lannelongue et al., 2021](#);
52 [Loubet et al.](#))—followed by air travel for international conferences, collabor-
53 ation, and fieldwork ([Ben-Ari et al., 2024](#)). Large research infrastructures
54 have been shown to generate emissions that can far exceed routine operations
55 ([Knödseder et al., 2024](#); [Odin et al., 2024](#); [Grealey et al., 2022](#); [Lang et al.,
56 2025](#); [Loubet et al.](#)).

57 Awareness of the gravity of the climate crisis is far more pronounced
58 within academia than in most other sectors. Cross-national surveys consis-
59 tently show near-universal recognition of climate change among academics
60 (above 95%) and very high levels of concern (80–95%) ([Dablander et al.,
61 2024](#); [Latter et al., 2024](#); [Whitmarsh et al., 2020](#)). These findings are corrob-
62 orated by several smaller-scale surveys focused on specific disciplines or insti-
63 tutions ([Kreil, 2021b](#); [Tseng et al., 2023](#)). Qualitative studies further high-
64 light tensions between decarbonization and institutional pressures such as
65 internationalization, competition, and resource allocation ([Marginson, 2022](#);
66 [Hopkins et al., 2016](#); [Higham and Font, 2020](#); [Kreil, 2021a](#); [Eriksson et al.,
67 2020](#); [Tseng et al., 2022b](#); [Higham et al., 2019](#); [Glover et al., 2019](#)).

68 Although the carbon footprint of knowledge production is increasingly
69 acknowledged—and key levers of decarbonization have been identified ([Eich-
70 horn et al., 2022](#); [Dotti et al., 2025](#))—climate action in academia remains
71 limited in scope. Institutions rarely adopt binding mitigation policies ([Tseng
72 et al., 2023](#); [Bjørkdahl and Franco Duharte, 2022](#); [Eichhorn et al., 2022](#);
73 [Stöber et al., 2021](#)), and most responses rely on symbolic gestures such as
74 net-zero pledges, charters, or awareness campaigns with limited regulatory

75 impact ([Boykoff and Oonk, 2020](#)).

76 In France, similar dynamics are observed. The carbon cost of research
77 has become a national issue across institutions and laboratories ([Ben-Ari,](#)
78 [2023](#); [Hardy, 2024](#); [Hardy et al., 2023](#); [Hardy, 2025](#)), and nearly half of re-
79 search units have assessed their emissions ([Mariette et al., 2022](#)). Yet few
80 institutions have implemented ambitious mitigation policies, and most efforts
81 remain largely declarative. This continued reliance on awareness and infor-
82 mational strategies echoes the communicative approaches historically used
83 to counter climate change denial, suggesting that academic climate inaction
84 is addressed through the same tools once mobilized against denial ([Boykoff](#)
85 [and Oonk, 2020](#)).

86 Climate change denial—understood as the negation or rejection of the
87 scientific consensus on the existence, causes, or consequences of climate
88 change—has long delayed mitigation efforts ([Dunlap et al., 2011](#)). Coor-
89 dinated campaigns have aimed to erode public trust in climate science by
90 manufacturing uncertainty and controversy ([Oreskes and Conway, 2010](#); [Cec-](#)
91 [carelli, 2011](#)), and by discrediting scientists and institutions ([Boussalis and](#)
92 [Coan, 2016](#)). This strategy is often described as “evidence skepticism” and
93 “process skepticism” ([Painter et al., 2023](#)), or more broadly as “epistemic
94 denial” ([Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014](#)).

95 However, epistemic denial alone cannot explain the persistence of climate
96 inaction in society. Recent research has turned to more diffuse mechanisms of
97 inaction: “response skepticism” ([Bonds, 2016](#)), “discourses of delay” ([Lamb](#)
98 [et al., 2020](#)), and “tertiary obstruction” ([Ekberg and Jylhä, 2023](#); [Forcht-](#)
99 [ner and Jylhä, 2024](#)) describe strategies that downplay the legitimacy or
100 urgency of climate policies, emphasize their perceived side effects, or de-
101 fend unsustainable infrastructures and practices—even among individuals or
102 institutions that recognize the reality of climate change and the need for mit-
103 igation. Arguments for opposing climate action include—but are not limited
104 to—the consideration of economic costs, policy ineffectiveness, and the re-
105 duction of personal freedom ([Boussalis and Coan, 2016](#); [Coan et al., 2021](#)).
106 These interlinked forms of obstruction often replace action with prolonged
107 debate and hesitation, even as the consequences of climate change become
108 more acute ([Jacques, 2012](#); [Brulle, 2023](#)).

109 In this article, we examine whether these secondary forms of obstruction
110 are also present within academia. To do so, we analyze attitudes and be-
111 havioral intentions related to climate action among academic and research
112 personnel. Academia provides a particularly informative context, not only

113 because overt climate denial is rare, but also because its members contribute
114 directly to the production of climate knowledge (Cook et al., 2016). The
115 persistence of limited engagement with climate mitigation in such a context
116 is therefore both paradoxical and analytically significant.

117 We conceptualize attitudinal patterns of climate inaction along four com-
118plementary dimensions: (1) climate change denial, capturing the epistemic
119 rejection of climate science; (2) reluctance toward academic climate change
120 mitigation, defined as the expression of general opposition to the inclusion of
121 academia in climate change mitigation efforts; (3) opposition to institutional
122 climate mitigation policies, capturing the refusal of a set of proposed climate
123 change mitigation policies within academia; and (4) institutional–individual
124 inconsistency, reflecting discrepancies between stated support for institu-
125 tional commitments and the refusal to adopt corresponding individual-level
126 behavioral changes.

127 These dimensions capture distinct forms of limited support for climate
128 action, from general reservations to opposition to policies and individual
129 changes. Using a national survey of 4,688 academics and research person-
130 nel in France, we examine how these barriers relate to perceived mitigation
131 costs, environmental attitudes—particularly toward degrowth—and profes-
132 sional characteristics. Although climate awareness is widespread, support
133 declines when mitigation challenges academic norms, highlighting the need
134 to align climate policies with institutional incentives and career structures.

135 **2. Materials and Methods**

136 *2.1. Study design and population*

137 We analyze data from the national survey “Academic and Research Per-
138 sonnel in the Face of Climate Change” conducted in France in 2020 (targeting
139 practices in 2019, pre-COVID). The survey was administered to a random
140 sample of 30,000 individuals drawn from the CNRS Labintel directory, cover-
141 ing universities and public research institutions organized in mixed research
142 units (UMR). A total of 6,724 responses were collected (20% response rate).
143 After data cleaning, the final dataset includes 6,468 individuals. Detailed
144 information, including survey bias is provided in the Supplement (see Ap-
145 [pendix A](#), section [S2](#) and [S3](#)). The main analysis focuses on 4,688 permanent
146 academic and research staff, as key questions were specifically designed for
147 this group. Respondents include researchers, faculty, engineers, technicians,

148 and administrative personnel across disciplines. Missing responses (including
149 “no opinion” and “not concerned”) are treated as informative categories.

150 *2.2. Outcome variables: attitudinal barriers*

151 We construct four complementary indicators of attitudinal barriers to cli-
152 mate action. Detailed information is provided in the Supplement. *Climate*
153 *Change Denial* is a binary variable identifying respondents who reject either
154 the existence of climate change or its anthropogenic origin. *Reluctance toward*
155 *Academic Climate Mitigation* is a binary variable that captures opposition
156 to the inclusion of academia in mitigation efforts, based on disagreement
157 with the need for changes in research practices or support for exempting
158 research from emission reduction targets. *Opposition to Institutional Miti-*
159 *gation Policies* is a count variable (0-10) measuring the number of proposed
160 institutional actions that respondents refuse. These actions include, among
161 others, limiting flights, subsidizing train travel, reducing conference weight
162 in evaluations, and integrating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into funding
163 criteria. *Institutional-Individual Inconsistency* is an ordinal variable (0-2)
164 capturing discrepancies between support for institutional policies and will-
165 ingness to adopt corresponding individual changes (*e.g.*, reducing flights, IT
166 equipment use, or energy-intensive research practices). Higher values indicate
167 stronger inconsistency. (see construction details in [Appendix A](#), section [S4](#)).

168 *2.3. Explanatory variables*

169 We consider socio-demographic and professional characteristics, includ-
170 ing age, gender, discipline, and career stage. Academic visibility is proxied
171 by the number of international conferences attended, publication rate, and
172 h-index. We also include two variables capturing perceived trade-offs asso-
173 ciated with mitigation: *Perceived Costs of Air Travel Reduction* and *Per-*
174 *ceived Costs of Equipment Reduction*, defined as the number of domains in
175 which respondents anticipate negative consequences (*e.g.*, scientific quality,
176 funding access, collaboration, or career progression). Finally, two attitudi-
177 nal variables are included: *Technological Optimism* (belief that technological
178 progress can solve environmental problems) and *Degrowth* (agreement that
179 reducing economic activity is necessary to address environmental challenges).
180 Detailed information is provided in [Appendix A](#), section [S5](#))

181 *2.4. Statistical analysis*

182 We adopt a nested analytical framework to examine successive layers of
183 attitudinal barriers. Specifically, we model: (1) denial in the full sample; (2)
184 reluctance among non-deniers; (3) opposition among non-deniers who are not
185 reluctant; and (4) inconsistency among respondents who support all institu-
186 tional actions. This approach allows us to identify where support for climate
187 action erodes without assuming causal ordering. We use logistic regression
188 for binary outcomes (denial, reluctance), negative binomial regression for
189 opposition (count), and proportional odds models for inconsistency (ordi-
190 nal). Multivariate models include all explanatory variables, with variance
191 inflation factors used to assess multicollinearity. Missing data are handled
192 using a mixed approach: variables with more than 10% missing values in-
193 clude a dedicated “missing” category, while others are imputed using multiple
194 imputation by chained equations (10 datasets). Outcome variables are not
195 imputed. Sensitivity analyzes (alternative imputations, non-nested models,
196 and alternative specifications) yield consistent results. All analyzes are con-
197 ducted in R (version 4.4.2). Detailed information is provided in [Appendix A](#),
198 section [S6](#)).

199 **3. Results**

200 The vast majority of surveyed permanent academics and research per-
201 sonnel (86%) consider substantial changes in research practices essential to
202 address the climate crisis, and 80% support reducing research-related GHG
203 emissions by at least one third by 2030, in line with national cross-sectoral
204 targets (Table [S1](#)). We examine the breadth and internal consistency of this
205 apparent consensus.

206 *3.1. Prevalence and Patterns of Attitudinal Barriers to climate action*

207 Climate change Denial, or epistemic denial, is rare in academia : 0.4%
208 of our study population deny the reality of climate change and 3.2% its
209 anthropogenic causes (*i.e.*, a total of 3.5%, Figure [2](#)). Reluctance toward
210 academic climate change mitigation is more prevalent, with 7% favoring an
211 exemption of the research sector from cross-sectoral mitigation efforts and 2%
212 rejecting the idea that substantial changes in research practices are necessary
213 (*i.e.*, a total of 8%, Figure [2](#)).

214 Support for climate action among academics drops sharply when concrete
215 mitigation actions are suggested to be implemented at the institutional level,




Figure 1: Nested analytical framework used to characterize four dimensions of attitudinal barriers to climate action in academia. The analysis proceeds sequentially from climate change denial to reluctance toward academic climate change mitigation, opposition to institutional mitigation policies, and institutional–individual inconsistency. Each step is estimated among the relevant subset of respondents, without assuming a causal or sequential relationship between the four dimensions.

216 with *Opposition* accounting for about 31% of attitudes (with 43% missing
217 values). Among these, 24% show mild opposition (refusing 1–2 of 10 pro-
218 posed institutional policies) and 7% show a stronger opposition (refusing ≥ 3
219 policies). Low levels of support are also observed when individual-level miti-
220 gation actions are suggested to academics who support institutional level
221 actions, with *Institutional–Individual Inconsistency* being detected in 29% of
222 the population (with 24% missing values), 21% showing mild *Inconsistency*
223 (willingness to reduce their GHG emissions by $< 1/3$ in a given domain, de-
224 spite stating that reducing GHG emissions in this domain is a priority at an
225 institutional level) and 8% showing a higher level (refusing to reduce their
226 GHG emissions in a given domain, despite stating that reducing GHG emis-
227 sions in this domain is a priority at an institutional level). Given their high
228 rate of missing values, the prevalence of *Opposition to Institutional Mitigation*
229 *Policies* and *Institutional–Individual Inconsistency* is likely underestimated.

230 Note that these four dimensions of attitudinal barriers to climate action
231 slightly overlap (see Figure S1), with, for example, *Opposition* and *Incon-*
232 *sistency* being found even among those who express *Reluctance*. In total,
233 we find that 54% of our population expresses support for at least one form
234 of inaction, 16% express full support for mitigation actions, and 30% have
235 missing values at any given level of action.

236 3.2. From Stated Support to Action: The Gap between Consensus and Indi- 237 vidual Commitment

238 To better understand the gap between, on the one hand, awareness of cli-
239 mate change and general support for climate change mitigation in academia
240 and, on the other hand, specific attitudes toward policies and individual com-
241 mitments, we review the support for the ten suggested institutional actions
242 and willingness to reduce individual professional GHG emissions by 2030. In-
243 stitutional actions span various policy instruments following (Verkerk et al.,
244 2022; Poortinga, 2025) (*i.e.*, norms, economic incentives, and informational
245 instruments) or push-and-pull policies that either discourage emitting prac-
246 tices through costs and restrictions or promote desired behavior through
247 incentives (see classification in Table 1).

248 Academics and research personnel generally support institutional climate
249 policies (Figure 2 panel A and Table S2). On average(range), 53% (32%-68%)
250 of the respondents identify the proposed policies as priorities, 21% (14%-
251 30%) as secondary, and 10% (3%-24%) express outright opposition, with
252 about 15% missing data. Four specific actions received lower yet prevailing

Climate policy	Policy instruments	Push vs. Pull	Domain
Set a limit on the number of flights	Norms	Push	Travel
Ban flights for trips that can be made in less than 6h by train	Norms	Push	Travel
Avoid replacing IT equipment of less than 5 years of age	Norms	Push	Purchases
Include GHG emissions into funding selection criteria	Norms	Push	Evaluation
Reduce the weight of conferences in career evaluations	Norms	Pull	Evaluation
Favor local and vegetarian menu providers	Norms	Pull	Diets
Subsidize train tickets	Economic incentives	Pull	Travel
Finance carbon offset initiatives	Economic incentives	Pull	Travel
Prioritize energy-efficient research equipment during replacements	Economic incentives	Pull	Purchases
Publish GHG inventories	Informational instrument	Pull	Evaluation

Table 1: Typology of climate policies tested in the survey, by domain and policy instrument.

253 support: integrating GHG emissions into research funding criteria, financing
 254 carbon offsets, publishing GHG inventories, and implementing flight limits.

255 However, when asked about their willingness to reduce their own profes-
 256 sional GHG emissions by 2030, support for climate action drops drastically
 257 (Figure 2 panel B and Table S2). On average across all actions, only 16%




Figure 2: Opinions regarding (A) institutional mitigation options and (B) changes in individual research practices within the study population of permanent academics and research personnel ($N = 4688$). Missing values—such as “no opinion” or “not concerned”—are incorporated into the variable distribution estimates, and missingness is displayed in grey on the graph. Institutional options (A) include: (a) subsidizing train tickets even if the journey is longer or more expensive than flying; (b) publishing detailed GHG inventories; (c) setting limits on the annual number of flights per person; (d) including GHG emissions among funding selection criteria; (e) reducing the weight of conferences in career evaluations; (f) banning flights for trips under 6 hours by train; (g) avoiding the replacement of functioning IT equipment before 5 years of use; (h) prioritizing energy-efficient equipment even when more expensive; and (i) favoring providers offering local or vegetarian menus. Options at the individual level (B) cover willingness to reduce GHG emissions in eight areas: (a) Reduce air-travel to attend conferences, congresses or meetings, (b) Reduce air, ship or car travel for fieldwork or data collection, (c) Reduce the number of scientific experiments or observations, (d) Reduce IT equipment use and replacement frequency and (e-h) Reduce the production and operation of equipment used for your scientific experiments and observations (e) By using it less frequently or less intensively, (f) By using or developing simpler devices (low tech), (g) By using fewer pieces of equipment in experimental setups, (h) By replacing equipment less frequently.

258 (5%-40%) of our population support substantial emissions reductions (*i.e.*,
259 by $>1/3$), while 11% (7%-18%) opt for limited mitigation (*i.e.*, by $<1/3$).
260 Additionally, 26% (6%-39%) are opposed to lowering their emissions, pre-
261 dominantly because they consider their GHG emissions to be already low
262 (about 45% missing data). Even those who believe research should lead by
263 example regarding GHG emissions reduction show considerable reluctance
264 when it comes to individual mitigation efforts, with only 22% (8%-53%) on
265 average supporting substantial reductions.

266 Two actions received comparatively larger support for substantial reductions
267 (*i.e.*, by $>1/3$): reducing flights to conferences (40%) and reducing IT
268 equipment use and replacement frequency (28%). Conversely, reductions in
269 the use of laboratory, experimental, or observational equipment were consid-
270 ered the least acceptable actions ($\leq 6\%$ opting for substantial reductions in
271 the number of equipment and frequency or intensity of use). Missing values,
272 despite being substantial, had a minimal effect on the comparative accept-
273 ability of actions (see Figure S2). Regarding those who considered their GHG
274 emissions to be already low, we cross-validated these self-assessments with
275 independent information collected in the survey about respondents' actual
276 practices (number of flights, use of energy intensive research facilities, IT
277 renewal) and the presence of mitigation incentives in their research units.
278 Results support the hypothesis that this response modality may be inter-
279 preted as an opposition to mitigation options (Supplement Appendix D),
280 which would result in a greater prevalence of *Inconsistency* than estimated
281 in this study.

282 3.3. Factors Associated with Attitudinal Barriers to Climate Action

283 We sequentially analyze how socio-demographic characteristics, profes-
284 sional status, academic success (h-index), international conference atten-
285 dance frequency, perceived costs associated with mitigation, and broader
286 attitudes towards the environment are associated with each of the four di-
287 mensions of attitudinal patterns of academic climate inaction (*i.e.*, *Denial*,
288 *Reluctance*, *Opposition*, and *Inconsistency*). Descriptive statistics for each
289 of these variables are given in Tables S4 and S5. Due to high VIF values,
290 the explanatory variable, *number of publications*, was excluded from the
291 multivariate models (see details in Table S6).

292 We rely on a nested analytical approach (see Figure 1) to examine where
293 support for academic climate change mitigation begins to weaken and to
294 identify the factors associated with successive layers of attitudinal barriers

295 to climate action. Accordingly, *Reluctance* is assessed among respondents
296 who do not deny climate change; *Opposition* among those who do not deny
297 climate change and are not reluctant toward climate mitigation in academia;
298 and *Inconsistency* among those who do not deny climate change, are not
299 reluctant, and support all institutional mitigation actions. A complete pre-
300 sentation of the prevalence of these attitudes is provided in Supplementary
301 Figure S1.

302 Results for *Denial*, *Reluctance*, and *Inconsistency* are presented as odds
303 ratios (OR), and results for *Opposition* as incidence rate ratios (IRR). ORs
304 indicate the likelihood of expressing a given attitudinal barrier, while IRRs
305 indicate the expected number of institutional actions refused. In multivariate
306 models, estimates are adjusted for all explanatory variables. Similar patterns
307 are observed across the four nested dimensions of mitigation refusal (Figure
308 3; Tables S7, S8, S9, and S10).

309 Perceived mitigation costs and lower support for degrowth emerge as the
310 factors most consistently associated with all four dimensions of attitudinal
311 barriers to climate action in adjusted models. Higher perceived costs and
312 lower agreement with degrowth are systematically associated with greater
313 non-support for mitigation policies. More precisely, compared to considering
314 degrowth as a response to environmental challenges (57% of our population),
315 the strongest opposition to degrowth (7%) is significantly associated with a
316 10-fold increased likelihood of denying climate change (OR [95% confidence
317 interval] = 10.4 [6.3;16.9]), with a 3-fold increased likelihood of being reluc-
318 tant toward academic climate change mitigation (OR=3.2 [2.2;4.6]), with a
319 2-fold increased expected number of institutional actions refused (IRR = 2.1
320 [1.8;2.5]), and with a 3-fold increased likelihood of a 1-point inflation in *the*
321 *Inconsistency* score (OR= 2.7[1.2;5.8]). Association estimates of similar mag-
322 nitude are found for the highest perceived costs of air travel reduction (*i.e.*,
323 a score of 5 to 8, 11%) compared to perceiving zero cost (12%) when mod-
324 eling *Opposition* (IRR=2.6 [2.2;3.2]) and *Inconsistency* (OR = 2.3 [1.3;4.1]);
325 a higher association was estimated for *Reluctance* (OR=6.8[3.8;11.9]), and a
326 lower association was estimated for *Denial* (OR = 2.6 [1.2;5.3]). The per-
327 ceived costs of experiment reduction policies is the third main variable associ-
328 ated with attitudinal barriers to climate action, despite a high rate of missing
329 data (51%). Compared to respondents who perceive zero cost (16%), those
330 with the highest perceived cost scores (*i.e.*, 4 to 5, 10%) exhibit a signifi-
331 cantly greater likelihood of expressing attitudinal barriers to climate action
332 (OR = 2.7 [1.2;5.9] for *Denial*, OR = 3.2 [1.9;5.2] for *Reluctance*, IRR=1.3

333 [1.1;1.5] for *Opposition*), and *Inconsistency*, OR = 1.7 [1.0;2.8].

334 Socio-demographic characteristics play a significant role in explaining at-
335 titudinal barriers to climate action. Higher odds of *Reluctance* (OR= 2.3
336 [1.7;3.1]) and *Inconsistency* (OR = 1.4 [1.0;1.9]) are found for men (57%)
337 compared to women (43%), and higher odds of *Denial* (OR= 6.2 [2.2;17.6])
338 are found for respondents over 60 years old (10%) compared to the youngest
339 group (aged 18–34, 10%).

340 Accounting for interaction terms in the models, men who are against de-
341 growth as a solution to environmental problems and perceive high costs of
342 air travel reduction (score of 3 or above, 9% of our population), have a 6-
343 fold increased likelihood of denying climate change compared to the opposite
344 profile (*i.e.*, women scientists who are not against degrowth - either support-
345 ing degrowth or missing value - and express no perceived costs of air travel
346 reduction, 5%); if not (*i.e.*, among those who do not deny climate change),
347 they have a 21-fold increased likelihood of being reluctant to academic mit-
348 igation; if not (*i.e.*, among those who do not deny climate change and are
349 not reluctant to academic mitigation), they are expected to refuse a 3-fold
350 higher number of institutional climate policies ; and if not (*i.e.*, among those
351 who do not deny climate change, are not reluctant to academic mitigation,
352 and support all institutional actions), they have a 3-fold increased likelihood
353 of a 1-point inflation in the Inconsistency score.

354 The effect of career status is largely captured by exposures to age, gen-
355 der, and h-index in multivariate models. Senior career position (35%) how-
356 ever, remains significantly associated with *Opposition* in adjusted models,
357 with a 2-fold higher expected number of institutional climate policies refused
358 compared to early-career researchers (1%). Broad research domains affect
359 attitudinal barriers to climate action, with medical and health sciences, and
360 physics and chemistry being associated with increased non-support for ac-
361 tion compared to humanities, languages, and literature, showing association
362 effects in the 2.1 to 3.1 range over one of the four dimensions of barriers to
363 climate action. Similarly, the h-index, publication rates, and attendance at
364 international conferences—proxies for academic visibility and success—are
365 all significantly associated with refusing academic mitigation actions in uni-
366 variate models, mostly related to *Reluctance* and *Opposition*. In multivariate
367 models, conference attendance dominates in the *Opposition* model, with as-
368 sociation effects of up to an IRR of 1.5 when attending at least 3 conferences
369 per year (9%) compared to none (35%).

370 In univariate models, firm belief in the ability of new technologies to solve

371 most environmental problems (10%) compared to not believing in this (41%)
372 is significantly associated with increased non-support for action at all levels;
373 however, the effect generally fades in multivariate models, mostly because
374 this information is partly redundant with the degrowth attitudinal variable
375 (V-Cramer=0.39).

376 Missing exposure values were informative, supporting a missing-not-at-
377 random (MNAR) mechanism. In particular, the missing category for per-
378 ceived costs of equipment reduction was associated with lower *Inconsistency*
379 and mainly included respondents not using energy-intensive facilities (88%
380 vs. 14% among non-missing values). Imputing all missing values reduced
381 the magnitude of associations with perceived mitigation costs and degrowth,
382 while revealing stronger disciplinary variations (Figure S3). Results were
383 robust across alternative specifications. Non-nested models yielded similar
384 estimates while additionally identifying significant age and conference at-
385 tendance effects (Figure S4). Similar patterns were also observed among
386 non-permanent personnel, despite their younger age and slightly stronger
387 disciplinary effects (Supplement Appendix C, Figure S5).




Figure 3: Multivariate regression modeling of (from left to right) *Climate Change Denial*, *Reluctance toward academic climate change mitigation*, *Opposition to Institutional Mitigation Policies*, and *Institutional-Personal Inconsistency*, fitted in a nested approach. *Climate-Mitigation Denial* is fitted by logistic regression (N=4,582), *Reluctance toward academic climate change mitigation* is fitted by logistic regression among those who do not deny climate change (N=4,381), *Opposition to Institutional Mitigation Policies* is fitted by negative binomial regression among those who do not deny climate change and are not reluctant toward academic mitigation (2,462), and *Institutional-Personal Inconsistency* by proportional odds-regression among those who do not deny climate change, are not reluctant toward academic mitigation and who support all institutional efforts only(N=1,126). IRR = Incidence rate ratio; OR = Odds ratio.

388 4. Discussion

389 Our results reveal a marked gap between broad support for climate ac-
390 tion and support for concrete mitigation measures within academia. While
391 86% of respondents recognize the need for substantial changes in research
392 practices and 80% support ambitious emission reduction targets, support
393 declines when mitigation involves specific institutional policies or individual
394 behavioral changes. Climate change denial remains marginal (3.5%), but
395 reluctance toward academic mitigation, opposition to institutional policies,
396 and institutional–individual inconsistency are substantially more prevalent
397 (8%, 31%, and 28%, respectively), together affecting more than half of the
398 study population.

399 Across all dimensions, perceived mitigation costs—particularly those re-
400 lated to air travel and equipment use—and lower support for degrowth
401 emerge as the main factors associated with attitudinal barriers to climate ac-
402 tion. Consistent with previous research, support for climate policies appears
403 shaped less by knowledge than by value orientations and perceived trade-offs
404 ([Dechezleprêtre et al., 2025](#); [Hornsey et al., 2016](#)), declining as mitigation is
405 perceived to entail greater personal or professional costs ([Poortinga, 2025](#)).
406 These patterns are further structured by socio-demographic and professional
407 characteristics, including gender, age, disciplinary background, seniority, and
408 academic visibility.

409 Taken together, these results reveal a tension between widespread recog-
410 nition of climate change and limited support for transformative action
411 when mitigation challenges established professional practices or institutional
412 norms. Rather than reflecting an academic exception, this pattern mirrors
413 broader social dynamics. We examine three cross-cutting dynamics shaping
414 these attitudes: sustainability pathways (technology vs. degrowth), per-
415 ceived mitigation costs, and professional norms and hierarchies, before dis-
416 cussing their implications for sustainability in academia.

417 4.1. *Degrowth vs. Technological solutions*

418 Our analysis shows that opposition to degrowth as a response to envi-
419 ronmental challenges is consistently associated with all four dimensions of
420 attitudinal barriers to climate action. Rejection of degrowth (21% of the
421 population and 44% among those who deny climate change or are reluctant
422 toward academic mitigation) appears as one of the most structuring atti-
423 tudinal divides, thereby delineating a clear boundary between support for

424 and resistance to climate action. This central role of degrowth suggests that
425 disagreements over mitigation are not only about specific policies but also
426 about broader visions of how environmental challenges should be addressed.

427 Optimism about technological solutions to environmental challenges (en-
428 dorsed by 43% of the total population and 56% among those who deny cli-
429 mate change or are reluctant toward academic mitigation) also contributes
430 to this divide, but its association loses statistical significance once degrowth
431 is accounted for (*i.e.*, in multivariate models; Tables [S7](#), [S8](#), [S9](#) and [S10](#)),
432 suggesting that these two dimensions partly capture overlapping value orien-
433 tations. Taken together, these results point to a divide between alternative
434 pathways to sustainability, often characterized as technology-driven versus
435 sufficiency-oriented approaches.

436 Degrowth is grounded in the premise that decoupling economic (or knowl-
437 edge) production from its biophysical impacts is insufficient to address the
438 scale of the environmental crisis ([Hickel et al., 2022](#); [Krpan et al., 2025](#)).
439 Core degrowth policies typically include reducing working hours and GHG
440 emissions or guaranteeing a basic income ([Kallis et al., 2025](#)). As such, sup-
441 port for degrowth can be interpreted as a proxy for progressive orientations
442 or, conversely, opposition to it as an indicator of more conservative views, in
443 line with studies indicating the highest support for climate policies among
444 individuals with positive normative views on state regulation, independently
445 of education levels ([Kongshøj and Hedegaard, 2025](#)).

446 Consistent with this interpretation, we find that 83% of respondents fa-
447 vorable to degrowth reported giving decisive weight to ecological issues in
448 their vote, confirming mechanisms observed in the general population ([Deche-
449 zleprêtre et al., 2025](#); [Hornsey et al., 2016](#)). Among those who strongly reject
450 degrowth, the divide is more balanced: 35% prioritized ecology in their voting
451 behavior, while 54% did not.

452 These value-based differences are further reflected in the types of poli-
453 cies respondents are willing to support. Among opponents of degrowth, the
454 strongest opposition is found for the most binding policies (regulations and
455 norms, described in [Table 1](#), results not shown). Similarly, strongest sup-
456 port among techno-optimists is found for the least constraining policies (eco-
457 nomic incentives and informational instruments). This is consistent with
458 ([King et al., 2023](#)), showing that degrowth proponents tend to favor di-
459 rect regulation, while supporters of green growth are more likely to accept
460 incentive-based policies such as subsidies.

461 Finally, support for degrowth is socially structured, reinforcing its role as

462 a central axis of differentiation within academia. The share of respondents
463 endorsing degrowth as a response to environmental challenges is highest in
464 ecology and environmental sciences (68%), closely followed by the humanities
465 (67%), while other fields range between 47% and 60%. Strong opposition to
466 degrowth is also associated with gender and age: among those who are totally
467 opposed, 70% are men and 48% are aged 50 or older, compared to 57% of
468 men and 38% aged 50 or older among respondents who consider degrowth
469 necessary.

470 *4.2. Costs of transition and climate delay narratives*

471 A second key result concerns the role of perceived mitigation costs, which
472 are consistently associated with all four dimensions of attitudinal barriers
473 to climate action. These findings suggest that perceived trade-offs strongly
474 shape support for climate mitigation, consistent with dynamics described
475 as “policy perfectionism” (Lamb et al., 2020) and previously documented in
476 academic contexts in France (Carbou and Sébastien, 2023).

477 Importantly, these perceived costs should not be interpreted solely as
478 rhetorical strategies used to justify inaction. In the present context, they
479 span several domains, including scientific outcomes, access to resources, col-
480 laboration opportunities, and career progression. As such, they likely reflect
481 real or anticipated tensions between mitigation objectives and existing aca-
482 demic practices and incentive structures.

483 We estimate the perceived costs of climate change mitigation in academic
484 research through a score that increases as respondents acknowledge a greater
485 number of effects as both actual and problematic. The same weight is given
486 to all answers. Answers can be grouped into four functional domains: (i)
487 scientific impact, (ii) resource and funding, (iii) visibility and collaboration,
488 and (iv) institutional and structural risks. This operationalization allows
489 us to capture the breadth of concerns associated with mitigation policies
490 (Mildenberger et al., 2023).

491 Empirically, these perceived costs are strongly associated with indica-
492 tors of academic visibility. Crossing perceived costs and visibility indicators,
493 we find that more visible researchers tend to report higher perceived costs
494 of air travel reduction, suggesting a greater reluctance toward policies that
495 may challenge existing academic performance models. Specifically, 35% of
496 frequent publishers (*i.e.*, those with ≥ 4 publications per year) report high
497 perceived costs (score ≥ 4), compared to only 18% among low-frequency pub-
498 lishers (< 1 per year). Similarly, 42% of regular conference attendees (≥ 3 in-

499 ternational conferences per year) report high costs, versus 20% among those
500 who attend rarely (<1 per year).

501 These results suggest that perceived costs are not merely anticipatory
502 or speculative but are rooted in structural dependencies between academic
503 recognition and emission-intensive practices. Since high visibility—whether
504 through publications or international conference participation—may be
505 partly sustained by such practices ([Berné et al., 2022](#)), mitigation efforts
506 may be perceived as directly challenging established pathways to academic
507 success.

508 *4.3. Professional norms and power asymmetries*

509 Consistent with previous research indicating that academic visibil-
510 ity—through publications, citations, or mobility—is associated with greater
511 carbon footprints ([Berné et al., 2022](#); [Jack and Glover, 2021](#); [Chalvatzis and](#)
512 [Ormosi, 2020](#)) and that high competitiveness tends to induce intensive fly-
513 ing practices ([Herschberg et al., 2018](#)), our findings suggest that entrenched
514 norms of academic success constitute a central barrier to support for climate
515 change mitigation, particularly those targeting air travel. This is especially
516 evident for regulatory policies (Table S2).

517 Empirically, indicators of academic visibility and productivity are
518 strongly associated with higher levels of attitudinal barriers. In univariate
519 analyzes, the strongest predictors among visibility indicators are a high pub-
520 lication rate for opposition and inconsistency, and the h-index for denial and
521 reluctance. High aeromobility (three or more round trips per year) is also as-
522 sociated with both greater opposition to institutional mitigation policies and
523 higher levels of institutional–individual inconsistency. Taken together, these
524 results suggest that academic success—understood in terms of productivity,
525 visibility, and mobility—is closely tied to practices that are difficult to recon-
526 cile with ambitious mitigation strategies. In this context, the accumulation of
527 “network capital” ([Elliott and Urry, 2010](#)) through mobility and productivity
528 may divert academics from supporting climate action, particularly when it
529 directly affects their own research practices.

530 These dynamics are further reinforced by social hierarchies within
531 academia. Men in senior positions are significantly more likely to express
532 attitudinal barriers to climate action. This gender gap echoes findings that
533 men are generally more skeptical and opposed to climate policies ([McCright](#)
534 [and Dunlap, 2011, 2010](#)) and tend to perceive higher costs associated with

535 mitigation, especially in wealthier countries ([Bechtel and Scheve, 2022](#)). Be-
536 yond gender, seniority—understood as career advancement—is associated
537 with greater opposition. These results are consistent with studies suggesting
538 that individuals who have benefited the most from academic hierarchies tend
539 to resist changes that might disrupt their professional practices or challenge
540 their privileged position ([Nicolas et al., 2023](#)).

541 Even mitigation policies that minimally interfere with existing practices
542 can face limited support. Carbon offsetting is among the least supported
543 institutional options (34% support, compared to 66% for the most widely fa-
544 vored options), along with the integration of GHG assessments into funding
545 decisions (32%). However, these patterns may also reflect broader concerns
546 about the effectiveness or design of such instruments. Offsetting, for instance,
547 has been widely criticized for its limited effectiveness ([Hyams and Fawcett,
548 2013](#)). Similarly, the relatively recent shift in France toward a competitive,
549 project-based funding system—where grant acquisition is increasingly cen-
550 tral to career advancement—has drawn criticism for its systemic side effects
551 ([Gross and Bergstrom, 2019](#)).

552 More broadly, these findings point to a tension between support for cli-
553 mate action in principle and resistance to concrete climate policies perceived
554 as disruptive, ineffective, or misaligned with academic values. While many
555 researchers endorse mitigation goals, they tend to favor strategies that pre-
556 serve existing norms while rejecting options they perceive as symbolic or
557 poorly designed ([Dechezleprêtre et al., 2025](#)).

558 Finally, these patterns are also structured along disciplinary lines. Taking
559 into account gender, seniority, visibility, and climate delay narratives, we find
560 that engineering is associated with higher odds of denial, physics and chem-
561 istry are associated with higher odds of both reluctance and inconsistency,
562 and medicine and health sciences are associated with higher probabilities of
563 inconsistency. While physics tends to be associated with the highest lev-
564 els of aeromobility and publication rates (results not shown; ([Berné et al.,
565 2022](#))), and ecology and environmental sciences also exhibit high levels of
566 both, this suggests a potential modulating role of disciplinary contexts in
567 shaping the relationship between academic success and support for climate
568 policies ([Whitmarsh et al., 2020](#)).

569 *4.4. Implications for climate action in academia*

570 Our findings provide insight into the attitudinal and behavioral patterns
571 associated with climate inaction in academia. However, these patterns can-

572 not be fully understood without considering the institutional structures that
573 shape academic practices, including entrenched norms, carbon-intensive in-
574 centives, and professional hierarchies (Chater and Loewenstein, 2022). In
575 this perspective, focusing solely on individual responsibility and engagement
576 (Dupont et al., 2025), without systemic transformation Krpan et al. (2025),
577 is unlikely to produce substantial change and may instead reinforce the status
578 quo.

579 In response to growing climate imperatives, academic institutions have
580 predominantly relied on traditional tools: disseminating knowledge, rais-
581 ing awareness, and improving climate literacy (Mendy et al., 2024). These
582 strategies mirror those historically used to combat denialism. Yet, our results
583 suggest that climate inaction in academia stems less from a lack of knowledge
584 than from divergences in sustainability pathways and from the real or per-
585 ceived costs associated with mitigation policies. In a research system driven
586 by competition, resource use intensification, and productivity metrics (*e.g.*,
587 publication counts, citations) (Lim et al., 2025), merely increasing awareness
588 is unlikely to foster change (Lewandowsky, 2021).

589 This implies that informational approaches, while necessary, are insuf-
590 ficient on their own. If they remain a central component of institutional
591 sustainability strategies, their scope should shift toward a more explicit en-
592 gagement with climate policy instruments, including their trade-offs, poten-
593 tial co-benefits (Skiles et al., 2022), and institutional implications.

594 *4.5. Strengths and limitations*

595 The main strength of this study lies in its combined conceptual and sta-
596 tistical approach, which distinguishes between denial, reluctance, opposition,
597 and inconsistency within a nested analytical framework. This approach al-
598 lows us to identify where support for climate action begins to weaken and to
599 examine the factors associated with each layer of attitudinal barriers. The
600 large sample size (nearly 5,000 individuals) further enables robust estimation
601 of these associations with substantial statistical power.

602 This study also has limitations. First, the representativeness of the study
603 population may be affected by selection bias, as individuals with stronger
604 positions regarding climate mitigation in academia may be more likely to
605 participate. This may influence the estimated prevalence of attitudinal bar-
606 riers. However, such bias is less likely to affect the structure of associations
607 identified in the analysis, provided that these relationships remain stable
608 across subgroups.

609 Second, the construction of the opposition score assigns equal weight
610 to heterogeneous mitigation policies, ranging from relatively low-cost actions
611 (e.g., subsidizing train travel) to more structurally constraining policies (e.g.,
612 integrating GHG emissions into funding criteria). While this choice was made
613 in the absence of a clear theoretical or empirical basis for differential weight-
614 ing, it may limit the ability to capture variation in the perceived stringency
615 or impact of different policy instruments. These limitations should be taken
616 into account when interpreting the results, but do not undermine the consis-
617 tency of the observed patterns.

618 **5. Conclusion**

619 This study shows that academia is not immune to the gap between climate
620 awareness and climate action. Although climate denial is marginal, support
621 for mitigation weakens when policies are perceived to conflict with established
622 norms of academic evaluation, productivity, and mobility. Addressing atti-
623 tudinal barriers, therefore, requires engaging with incentive systems, power
624 relations, and organizational constraints rather than relying primarily on
625 individual-level change. Without such structural adjustments, efforts to pro-
626 mote climate action risk remaining largely symbolic rather than translating
627 into sustained and effective transformation.

628 By distinguishing denial, reluctance, opposition, and institu-
629 tional-individual inconsistency, we show that climate inaction in academia
630 is structured by perceived costs, competing visions of sustainability, pro-
631 fessional hierarchies, and dominant norms of productivity and recognition.
632 These findings suggest that awareness-raising alone is unlikely to produce
633 substantial change in a community where awareness is already high.

634 If research institutions are to contribute credibly to climate mitigation,
635 they will need policies that address the institutional incentives and pro-
636 fessional norms sustaining high-carbon academic practices. In this sense,
637 the challenge for academia is not only to produce knowledge about climate
638 change, but also to transform the conditions under which knowledge itself is
639 produced.

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



Figure 1

(A) What actions should research institutions (and/or research units) take to cut GHG emissions?



(B) Are you willing to reduce your GHG emissions by 2030 in the following areas?





Figure 2




Figure 3