

1 How high is high enough? A multi-million-member ensemble analysis of future climate scenarios and  
2 their relevance

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21 Preprint server: this manuscript is a non-peer reviewed preprint submitted to EarthArXiv

22 Peer review journal submission: this manuscript is intended for submission to the Proceedings of the  
23 National Academy of Sciences of the United States

24

25 Classification:

26 Social Sciences, Environmental Sciences

27 Physical Sciences, Environmental Sciences

28

29 Keywords:

30 Climate scenarios, probability, RCP8.5, risk

31 **Abstract:**

32 Assessments of high-forcing climate scenarios provide unique insight into possible high-risk climate  
33 change impacts in the 21st century and beyond. Given rapid and ongoing societal changes (e.g.,  
34 population growth, energy demand, technology, etc.), debates are increasing on the continued  
35 relevance of these 'high-forcing' scenarios, such as those designed to reach 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> by the end of the  
36 century (e.g., RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5). Here, we determine an updated probability of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup>  
37 by 2100 by generating a multi-million-member ensemble from a newly developed database of  
38 probabilistic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenarios, augmented here with improved  
39 characterization of aerosols and minor GHGs, coupled with the newest version of a reduced complexity  
40 climate model, with parameter distributions calibrated to match the IPCC 6<sup>th</sup> Assessment Report. The  
41 probability of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> this century is estimated to be less than 1%, however, we discuss  
42 important rationales for the continued use of 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> scenarios, including for generating high  
43 temperature scenarios for use in calibrating damage functions, characterizing climate in the 22<sup>nd</sup> century  
44 (probability of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> increases to ~7% by 2150), and assessing low-probability/high-  
45 impact futures..

46

47 **Significance Statement:**

48 Controversy exists regarding the relevance of 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> high-end climate scenarios. We calculate the  
49 likelihood of these scenarios. We show a less than 1% probability of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> by the end of  
50 the century but also discuss why these scenarios are still useful for anchoring the high end of damage  
51 functions, for providing analogues for climates after the year 2100, and for investigating the outcomes  
52 of low probability but high impact futures.

53

54 **Introduction:**

55 Representation Concentration Pathway (or RCP) 8.5 was the highest of four concentration scenarios  
56 (RCP2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5) developed as inputs for the CMIP5 modeling exercise (Moss et al. 2010, van  
57 Vuuren et al. 2011). The numerical component of the scenario name refers to the increase in radiative  
58 forcing between pre-industrial times and 2100 in the scenario in units of watts per square meter  
59 (W/m<sup>2</sup>). The RCP scenarios were used in climate models to inform the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report  
60 (AR5) and the US National Climate Assessment (NCA4), as well as innumerable research papers. While  
61 NCA4 used the full range of RCP scenarios, the assessment focused most closely on RCP4.5 and RCP8.5,  
62 which they considered as low-end and high-end scenarios, to be consistent with the range of scenarios  
63 used in previous assessments (USGCRP, 2015). These two scenarios were also the most heavily  
64 represented in the existing literature at the time. More recently, a new set of Shared Socioeconomic  
65 Pathway (SSP) scenarios were developed for the CMIP6 modeling exercise (O'Neill et al. 2016, Riahi et  
66 al. 2017), which were intended to more fully integrate changes in socioeconomics with changes in  
67 radiative forcing, and included new radiative forcing endpoints of 1.9, 3.4, and 7.0 W/m<sup>2</sup>, peak and  
68 decline scenarios, and alternate socioeconomic assumptions (SSP1 through 5) for many of the scenarios.  
69 The SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5 scenarios are considered the closest analogues to RCP4.5 and 8.5, which may  
70 account for why these two scenarios are similarly highly represented in the literature.

71 RCP8.5 has been characterized as a scenario that assumes high population growth, low income growth,  
72 and modest improvements in energy intensity over the next century, leading to high energy demand  
73 and GHG emissions (Riahi et al. 2011, Moss et al. 2010). The research community originally developed  
74 the four scenarios as “plausible futures”, with RCP8.5 roughly representing the upper 10<sup>th</sup> percentile of  
75 radiative forcing from scenarios in the published literature at the time of development in 2007 (Moss et  
76 al. 2010). However, this is not a rigorous method for determining probability of exceedance of a  
77 scenario. Because no probabilities were assigned to these scenarios from the literature, this 10%  
78 statistic may bear little resemblance to an actual probability of exceedance: the distribution includes  
79 both policy and non-policy scenarios leading to an underestimate of BAU emissions; the majority of the  
80 scenarios are likely to be designed as “best-estimates” which will underweight the tails; and carbon  
81 cycle uncertainties may not have been included in all the studies, again underweighting tails.

82 Due in part to the use of RCP8.5 in the NCA4 and other assessments, as well as the continued use and  
83 interest in SSP5-8.5, questions regarding the plausibility (e.g., Christensen et al. 2018, Schwalm et al.  
84 2020, or Kemp et al. 2022) or implausibility (e.g., Hausfather and Peters, 2020, Burgess et al. 2020, Skea  
85 et al. 2021, Srikrishnan et al. 2022, or Pielke et al. 2022) of 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> scenarios have steadily increased.  
86 Additionally, the recent IPCC AR6 report stated that “the likelihood of high-emissions scenarios such as  
87 RCP8.5 or SSP5-8.5 is considered low in light of recent developments in the energy sector” (Chen et al.  
88 2021). Importantly, while most of these evaluations of RCP8.5 or SSP5-8.5 have focused on the  
89 plausibility or implausibility of the fossil fuel usage and/or emissions pathways in the scenario, it is  
90 important to recognize that when these scenarios are used as input to global climate models (GCMs),  
91 they are primarily used as concentration pathways rather than emission scenarios (several of the studies  
92 previously referenced do discuss the potential importance of carbon cycle uncertainties, though without  
93 analyzing the implications of including those uncertainties – e.g., Hausfather and Peters 2020, Chen et  
94 al. 2021, and Srikrishnan et al. 2022). Huard et al. 2022 has also highlighted this issue of evaluating  
95 scenarios based on their emissions versus their concentrations. Radiative forcing is a simplifying  
96 aggregate metric to consider rather than comparing individual greenhouse gas concentrations. This  
97 then leads to two related questions: 1) given the latest available societal projections, what is the  
98 likelihood of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> by the end of the century, and 2) what is the appropriate likelihood for  
99 the high-end scenario to include in scientific assessments? This paper addresses those questions.

100 To answer these questions, this paper has several primary aims. First, we leverage recent advances in  
101 probabilistic emission projections (RFF-SPs, Rennert et al. 2022a, Rennert et al. 2022b), and coupled  
102 these with a state-of-the-art simple climate model (FaIR version 2.1, Leach et al. 2021), augmented with  
103 improved methods to account for emissions of aerosols and minor GHGs (based on Lamboll et al. 2020),  
104 to generate a multi-million-member ensemble to derive an updated probability density function for end  
105 of century radiative forcing. Second, we use the forcing probability density function from this ensemble  
106 of equally probable emissions scenarios and climate parameter combinations to determine the  
107 likelihood of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> in 2100 (or 2150). Lastly, we discuss considerations for the appropriate  
108 choice of likelihood for an upper bound, high forcing, scenario depending on the relevant application.


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## 110 **Results:**

111 We first compare emission levels across the RFF-SP scenarios to those in the SSP scenarios (Figure 1) by  
112 calculating the number of RFF-SP scenarios where CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2100 exceed those in six SSP

113 scenarios, and then divide by the 10,000 total scenarios to come up with a probability of exceedance.  
 114 We also repeat this calculation with GWP-weighted emissions to account for the role of non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHGs.  
 115 Table 1 shows the results of these calculations, with the 2100 emissions from each SSP scenario included  
 116 in the left column for comparison.

117 Figure 1: Mean and the 95% and 5% bounds for CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the RFF-SP scenarios, as well as CO<sub>2</sub>  
 118 emissions from six SSP-RCPs, from 2000-2300



119

120

121 Table 1: Probability that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2100 (absolute & GWP-weighted) in the 10,000 RFF-SP  
 122 scenarios exceed those in six of the SSP scenarios. Global warming potentials (GWPs) are from IPCC AR4.

Comparison scenario End-of-century emissions	CO <sub>2</sub> -only	GWP weighted	Cumulative CO <sub>2</sub> by 2100 (GtC)
SSP5-8.5 126 GtCO <sub>2</sub> 142 GtCO <sub>2</sub> e	0.030%	0.020%	3078
SSP3-7.0 82.7 GtCO <sub>2</sub> 108 GtCO <sub>2</sub> e	1.1%	0.46%	2813
SSP4-6.0 21.9 GtCO <sub>2</sub> 39.0 GtCO <sub>2</sub> e	41.8%	36.3%	2585
SSP2-4.5 9.68 GtCO <sub>2</sub> 19.7 GtCO <sub>2</sub> e	66.3%	71.8%	2523
SSP4-3.4 -14.8 GtCO <sub>2</sub> -0.921 GtCO <sub>2</sub> e	100%	100%	2353
SSP1-2.6 -8.62 GtCO <sub>2</sub>	100%	100%	2337


-3.07 GtCO <sub>2</sub> e			
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123

124 The RFF-SP emissions are then used as inputs to the FaIR model. Each of the emissions scenarios is run  
 125 with all 1001 FaIR parameter combinations, for 10,010,000 total output scenarios. Figure 2 shows the  
 126 radiative forcing from the SSP scenarios (run in FaIR with the same calibration) overlaid on top of the  
 127 90% bounds of this analysis. Table 1 shows the percentage of the runs from this analysis that exceed  
 128 each forcing threshold in 2100 and then again in 2150.

129

130 Figure 2: Mean and the 95% and 5% bounds for total radiative forcing from the RFF-SPs scenarios run  
 131 through FaIR 2.1 with the 1001 parameter sets, as well as total radiative forcing from six SSP-RCP  
 132 emission scenarios run through FaIR 2.1.



133

134 Table 2: Probability that total radiative forcing from the RFF-SP scenarios combined with FaIR climate  
 135 uncertainty exceeds each SSP radiative forcing threshold in 2100, 2150, or 2300

Radiative forcing threshold (W/m <sup>2</sup> )	Year: 2100	Year: 2150	Year: 2300
8.5	0.53%	6.9%	20%
7.0	7.2%	22%	32%
6.0	25%	37%	43%
4.5	68%	65%	62%
3.4	92%	85%	77%
2.6	99%	95%	86%

136

137 To assess the relative contributions of emissions uncertainty and climate parameter uncertainty, we also  
 138 produce Figure 3, in the tradition of Hawkins and Sutton (2009) and Lehner et al. (2020). Figure 3 shows


139 a timeseries of the range of radiative forcing and temperatures (an output from FaIR) resulting from the  
140 1001 FaIR runs around the emissions scenario with median forcing (climate uncertainty), the 10,000 RFF-  
141 SP runs with a single FaIR parameter set (chosen as having the median climate sensitivity; emissions  
142 uncertainty), and the combination of the two (total uncertainty), along with the fractional contribution  
143 of each. Note that climate variability is included in all analyses, such that summing the individual  
144 uncertainty contributions is expected to exceed the actual total uncertainty.

145


146 Figure 3: Annual radiative forcing (a,b) and temperature (c,d) projections, showing the 5<sup>th</sup> to 95<sup>th</sup> %  
147 bounds from emissions uncertainty, climate parameter uncertainty, and total combined uncertainty.  
148 Note that internal climate variability contributes to all three uncertainty distributions.

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151



152

153 **Discussion**

154 The relevance of a particular future scenario depends on the application, purpose, and audience of a  
 155 particular analysis or assessment. However, the relevance also depends on the probability of exceeding  
 156 the metric of interest, whether it be a given quantity of emissions, concentration of CO<sub>2</sub> or CO<sub>2</sub>-  
 157 equivalent, total radiative forcing, global temperature, or some other metric. Despite the low probability  
 158 of exceeding 8.5W/m<sup>2</sup> by the end of the century (Table 2), there are at least three applications where it  
 159 remains crucial to consider these high-forcing, low-probability scenarios: 1) development of damage  
 160 functions or “by-degree” climate impact analyses, 2) as an analogue for post-2100 climate change, and  
 161 3) consideration of low probability but high impact possibilities.

162 For the first application, “by-degree” climate impact analyses are mostly scenario agnostic (Sarofim et al.  
 163 2021). However, the higher the emissions driving the analysis, the larger a temperature (or other  
 164 climate parameter) range that will be covered, making a high-end, but plausible, future desirable. As  
 165 damage functions are essentially a mathematical fit to a “by-degree” approach, the anchor for the high  
 166 end of the damage function should be a low probability scenario (note that it can also be important to  
 167 have a similar anchor for the low-end in order to explore marginal benefits of additional mitigation even  
 168 when a stringent policy future is used as the reference). For example, Hartin et al. (2023) uses piecewise

169 linear extrapolation between data points to assess climate change damages across a given range of  
170 temperature scenarios.

171 The second application regarding post-2100 analogues is relevant because most GCM scenario  
172 projections end in 2100 (O'Neill et al. 2016), except for a few GCMs which were run with extended  
173 scenarios. Therefore, the majority of the impacts literature is based on scenarios that end in 2100.  
174 However, the real world will continue past that date. For this reason, we argue that climate projections  
175 for 2100 under high forcing scenarios can be used as analogues for climates that may not be seen until  
176 much later. This use of climate projections for one year as an analogue for climate impacts in a different  
177 year is the fundamental concept behind the "temperature slice" or "global warming level" approach  
178 (e.g., Sarofim et al. 2021, Schleussner et al. 2016). Given this application, we have calculated the  
179 probability density function of radiative forcing in 2150 to show that the probability of exceeding 8.5  
180 W/m<sup>2</sup> reaches almost 7% due to a combination of potential continued emissions as well as climate  
181 feedbacks. While the 0.5% probability of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> is below the 1% relevance threshold we  
182 discuss below, it is difficult to argue policy irrelevance with a probability of exceedance of greater than  
183 5%, even if the date is further in the future. While we have chosen 2150 to illustrate this point, we will  
184 note that projections developed for the social cost of greenhouse gas extend through 2300 (Rennert et  
185 al. 2022), and the exceedance probability of 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> is 20% by the end of this period.

186 For the third application, low probability but high impact events are often of relevance to policymakers.  
187 As discussed further in the following paragraphs, the precise probability of exceedance becomes  
188 relevant in assessing risk in these contexts. This discussion of probability is also relevant to the choice of  
189 the high-end anchor for damage functions or by-degree analyses and for deciding the hottest post-2100  
190 potential climate for which to simulate an analogue. The question then becomes how likely does a  
191 scenario have to be to be relevant? On the small end, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) recommended an  
192 annual risk of 1 in a million for a large, early release of radioactivity from a nuclear plant. On the larger  
193 end, few people would carry an umbrella with them if the probability of rain was less than 10%.  
194 However, these examples do not provide good context for the appropriate choice of likelihood for a  
195 high-end climate scenario. Many potential examples involve repeated probabilities for individual events  
196 that can happen at multiple locations (e.g., the nuclear example, or the choice of the 1 in 100 year  
197 flooding event for floodplain analysis). In contrast, climate change involves a global, accumulating  
198 problem where the probability of a high-end scenario is a function of socioeconomic assumptions and  
199 uncertainty in basic scientific parameters. We choose 1% as a policy relevant probability for a high-end  
200 scenario for generalized climate analysis purposes, though recognizing that others could choose a  
201 different threshold.

202 Several considerations are relevant for these three applications. There is the choice to focus on  
203 probability of exceeding radiative forcing rather than emissions. There are challenges involved in  
204 characterizing uncertainty, particularly for low probability tails of distributions. And there is the  
205 recognition that even if there are good reasons to include a high scenario in an analysis, that scenario is  
206 not necessarily the most relevant scenario.

207 Because CMIP GCMs and ESMs are generally driven by concentration scenarios, not emission scenarios,  
208 it is the probability of exceeding those concentrations which is most relevant. Radiative forcing is the  
209 best available metric to use to represent the aggregate climate impact of a concentration pathway,  
210 though it has some drawbacks. For example, different GCMs can have different radiative physics, such



211 that different GCMs run with the same set of GHG and aerosol concentrations may result in different  
212 levels of forcing and two emission scenarios with the same forcing in one GCM may diverge when run in  
213 a second. Relevantly, while the IIASA database for scenarios suggests that RCP8.5 reaches 8.4 W/m<sup>2</sup> in  
214 2100 and SSP5-8.5 reaches 8.7 W/m<sup>2</sup>, more recent simple climate models incorporating updated  
215 knowledge in Earth system processes yield higher radiative forcings from the same set of concentrations  
216 (Byers et al. 2022). The most relevant forcing is the one embodied within the GCM calculations.  
217 Fredriksen et al. (2023) show that GCM-derived forcing is markedly higher for SSP5-8.5 in CMIP6 models  
218 than for RCP8.5 in CMIP5 models. Tebaldi et al (2021) estimate that most GCMs reach 8.9 W/m<sup>2</sup> by 2100  
219 for SSP5-8.5. Wyser et al. estimated 9.2 W/m<sup>2</sup> in the EC-Earth3-Veg GCM for SSP5-8.5, but only 7.8  
220 W/m<sup>2</sup> for RCP8.5. However, here we focus on radiative forcing as the best available metric, even while  
221 recognizing its imperfections.

222 In addition, when looking at low probability outcomes, considerations of additional sources of unbiased  
223 (no more likely to be above the reference parameters than below) uncertainty will always increase the  
224 probability of exceeding those outcomes. For example, while the chance of the world having higher  
225 forcing than the SSP5-8.5 scenario in 2100 is a low probability outcome, it is more likely than the chance  
226 of exceeding SSP5-8.5 emissions. In this case, the probability of exceeding the emissions in the SSP5-8.5  
227 scenario in 2100 when taking the RFF-SP distribution as truth is substantially lower than 1%. Even the  
228 probability of exceeding SSP3-7.0 emissions by 2100 is on the order of 1%. However, when we move to  
229 radiative forcing, the probabilities become substantially larger: 0.5% for exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup>, and 7% for  
230 exceeding 7 W/m<sup>2</sup>. A key contributor to this increase in the probability of exceedance is the inclusion of  
231 additional uncertainties, in particular carbon cycle and methane feedbacks, and methane chemistry  
232 uncertainties. Because there are more emissions scenarios that are just short of SSP5-8.5 than just larger  
233 than SSP5-8.5, changing parameter draws would be more likely to push a concentration pathway over  
234 the SSP5-8.5 threshold than to pull a pathway under it.

235 Figure 3 shows that climate parameter uncertainty is the driver of near-term uncertainty in both  
236 radiative forcing and temperature. Our analysis shows that while climate parameter uncertainty and  
237 emissions uncertainty become equal contributors to total forcing uncertainty by 2050, climate  
238 parameter uncertainty exceeds emissions uncertainty almost through 2100 for temperature uncertainty.  
239 This is a result of there being a more limited set of uncertain climate parameters that impact forcing  
240 (aerosol forcing, carbon cycle, and methane feedback uncertainties being some of the more important),  
241 and a more expansive set of climate parameters that impact temperature (climate sensitivity and ocean  
242 heat uptake being key). While most of this paper discusses radiative forcing as it is the key input to  
243 climate models, the presentation of temperature uncertainty is important as it is the actual driver of  
244 impacts that are relevant to human and ecological experiences. Two key advances over the previous  
245 Hawkins and Sutton (2009) and Lehner et al. (2020) are the use of fully probabilistic emission and  
246 climate parameter uncertainty inputs for this analysis (rather than, for example, assuming that the RCPs  
247 are all equally likely).

248 Of course, projecting even to 2100, less than 80 years into the future, is a challenging task, particularly  
249 for socioeconomic conditions that are key factors in determining future emissions. Barron (2018)  
250 discusses some of the challenges in projecting future penetration of low-carbon technologies using  
251 climate policy models. While the RFF-SP scenarios may be the best probabilistic emissions forecast  
252 available, these probabilities must be taken with some skepticism, particularly in the tails (such as the  
253 1% threshold that we focus on). The RFF-SPs rely primarily on expert elicitation, but there are other

254 approaches. Liu and Raftery (2021) use a Bayesian approach to drive a Markov chain Monte Carlo for  
255 developing emission scenarios. Morris et al. (2022) apply a complex computable general equilibrium  
256 model driven with uncertain input parameters whose distributions are defined by a combination of  
257 expert elicitation and statistical analysis of historical data. All these projections seem to be reasonably  
258 well aligned. The definition of “business as usual” can also be a challenging one – for the RFF-SP  
259 scenarios, the experts were instructed to provide economic growth estimates absent the effects of  
260 future climate change or additional policy efforts to reduce emissions, but several of the experts  
261 acknowledged that their final probability distributions did include some internalization of future climate  
262 policies and impacts. Moreover, experts were instructed to include views about the evolution of future  
263 policy for projecting changes in technology, fuel use, and other socioeconomic conditions relevant to  
264 emission factors.

265 While there is more confidence in the climate uncertainty probabilities as expressed in the 1001 FaIR  
266 ensemble members compared with the socioeconomic uncertainties driving emission projections, there  
267 are also some limitations regarding these physical parameter definitions. In particular, any feedbacks  
268 that don’t exist in either the historical record or the climate models against which FaIR was calibrated  
269 will not be captured by this analysis. Prior distributions for FaIR parameters were informed by CMIP6  
270 GCMs, and the potential for the uncertainty space to be under-sampled exists. Furthermore, the  
271 permafrost feedback is not included in FaIR, which has the potential to contribute substantially to  
272 radiative forcing and warming through release of additional CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub>.

273 While our analysis shows that 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> scenarios are appropriate for use in creating damage functions,  
274 and important to include in the next round of CMIP analyses, it is important to reiterate that 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> is  
275 still an unlikely future outcome – even through the 22<sup>nd</sup> century. We are arguing here for the inclusion of  
276 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> scenarios to anchor the high end of possible outcomes or to develop damage functions, but  
277 not necessarily as the most relevant future. One pertinent example is the use of a future scenario for  
278 use in adaptation decisions. There are often non-negligible costs associated with over-adaptation: e.g.,  
279 for sea level rise, there are expenses involved in building higher sea walls than would be optimal from a  
280 cost-benefit analysis, and in some cases, there could be unnecessary abandonment of properties based  
281 on over-reliance on pessimistic forecasts. While it may be appropriate to use a scenario that is higher  
282 than the median or mean scenario, something like the 25% likely 6 W/m<sup>2</sup> scenario might be better  
283 suited than the 1% likely 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> scenario. However, this does not mean an 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> scenario can’t  
284 be relevant: the use of a by-degree approach allows for the GCM output of such a scenario to be used as  
285 analogues for lower temperatures whose probabilities are calculated by the use of reduced complexity  
286 models (such as FaIR and the RFF-SPs).

287 One noteworthy issue is that the estimated likelihood of high forcing scenarios has declined over time.  
288 While, as discussed in the introduction, there was no formal probability assigned to the 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup>  
289 scenario though it was chosen to represent the upper 10% of existing scenarios (Moss et al., 2010),  
290 Webster et al. (2009) combined probabilistic estimates of emissions and climate parameters to estimate  
291 a 90% upper bound of 9.8 W/m<sup>2</sup> relative to 1990 (or about 11.6 W/m<sup>2</sup> relative to pre-industrial).  
292 Therefore, over the past 14 years, the probability of exceeding 8.5 W/m<sup>2</sup> by the end of the century has  
293 dropped from double digits to below one percent. While some of this reduction of the high end of  
294 possible forcing futures may be due to better information about climate uncertainty, it is likely that the  
295 majority is due to reductions in estimated future emissions, due to a combination of technological

296 progress and policy action. This is good news, and the trend towards lower probability of high forcing  
297 scenarios will hopefully continue in the future.

298

## 299 **Conclusions**

300 Here we use a 10 million-member-ensemble to analyze the probability of exceeding  $8.5 \text{ W/m}^2$  in 2100,  
301 2150, and 2300. Our results show that while the probability of exceeding this threshold in 2100 is less  
302 than 1%, it reaches 7% by 2150, and 20% by 2300. Because many climate analyses to date have focused  
303 on the current century, a scenario that reaches  $8.5 \text{ W/m}^2$  in 2100 continues to have substantial  
304 relevance for serving as an analogue for post-2100 climates, as well as for driving impacts models to  
305 develop damage functions that can be useful through the year 2300.

306 Therefore, it is important that the CMIP community continue to include an  $8.5 \text{ W/m}^2$  scenario in the  
307 family of scenarios for CMIP7. In addition, if an impact modeler is only going to use a single scenario,  $8.5$   
308  $\text{W/m}^2$  is the appropriate scenario to use – not because it is the most likely, but because it can serve to  
309 inform a by-degree approach which can be coupled with a reduced complexity model to estimate the  
310 timing and probability of reaching future forcing and temperature thresholds, enabling the discussion of  
311 almost any possible future including years past 2100 (with a possible exception of peak-and-decline  
312 scenarios). However, if it becomes standard in the future to run impacts analyses through later years  
313 (such as 2150), it might be more appropriate to choose a high-end scenario which reaches  $8.5 \text{ W/m}^2$  in  
314 that later year (rather than 2100).

315 While our analysis suggests that  $8.5 \text{ W/m}^2$  continues to be sufficiently likely to be relevant based on  
316 projections founded on today's best estimates, we hope that as zero carbon technologies continue to  
317 become more competitive, and mitigation efforts continue to increase, that soon the  $8.5 \text{ W/m}^2$  scenario  
318 might drop enough in likelihood that our arguments for continuing to include it would no longer hold.

319

## 320 **Methods**

321 We quantify the likelihood of exceeding  $8.5 \text{ W/m}^2$  by the end of the century by developing a probability  
322 density function, based on two components: 1) probabilistic projections of greenhouse gas (GHG) and  
323 aerosol emissions and 2) coupling these with a simple climate model that accounts for additional  
324 uncertainty in climate parameters. To derive emission projections, we start with the 10,000 global GHG  
325 emission scenarios from the Resources for the Future Socioeconomic Projections (RFF-SP) dataset,  
326 which provides global  $\text{CO}_2$ ,  $\text{CH}_4$  and  $\text{N}_2\text{O}$  emissions from 2020 through 2300 (Rennert et al. 2022a). While  
327 the original RFF-SP scenarios assumed that additional short-lived climate forcers (tropospheric ozone  
328 and aerosol precursors) and other greenhouse gases followed the SSP2-4.5 scenario, here we infill the  
329 RFF-SP GHG scenarios using the *silicone* tool (Lamboll et al. 2020). Infilling uses a database of existing  
330 integrated assessment model (IAM) GHG and air pollutant emissions scenarios and uses relationships  
331 between a lead species (in our case  $\text{CO}_2$  emissions from fossil fuels and industry) and those that are not  
332 present in the RFF-SPs. The logic behind this is that emissions of  $\text{CO}_2$  tend to be well-correlated with  
333 emissions of non- $\text{CO}_2$  species over time (Rogelj et al. 2014) as many species are co-emitted with  $\text{CO}_2$ .  
334 Where they are not, high emissions scenarios tend to be indicative of high economic activity, low levels  
335 of climate and air quality policy, or both (and vice versa for low emissions scenarios). In this analysis, we

336 use the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) Working Group 3 (WG3) infiller database (Kikstra et al.  
337 2022; Byers et al. 2022). The emissions in this database have been harmonized (Gidden et al. 2018) to  
338 ensure a smooth transition from historically reported emissions values to future scenario projections. As  
339 the RFF-SP dataset only provides total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions this contribution needs to be split into fossil fuel  
340 and industrial (FFI) emissions and land use (AFOLU) emissions to run FaIR and perform the infilling. This  
341 was performed using the silicone toolbox with the “time-dependent ratio” method, mapping FFI and  
342 AFOLU emissions to total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the AR6 infiller database using the average ratio of AFOLU  
343 and FFI to total CO<sub>2</sub> across the database (Lamboll et al. 2020).

344 We replicate the infilling methods of the IPCC Working Group 3 report (Kikstra et al. 2022; Riahi et al.  
345 2022) as closely as possible. For example, short-lived climate forcers (SO<sub>2</sub>, BC, OC, NH<sub>3</sub>, NO<sub>x</sub>, CO and  
346 VOCs) are infilled using the “quantile rolling windows” (QRW) method of silicone. We use CO<sub>2</sub> FFI as the  
347 lead species and the AR6 infiller database. QRW maps the lead specie (CO<sub>2</sub> FFI) to a specified quantile of  
348 emissions of the desired pollutant from the infiller database over time. We use the 50th percentile for  
349 each short-lived forcer. This preserves relationships of co-emittance between high and low emissions  
350 scenarios (e.g. high CO<sub>2</sub> FFI likely implies high SO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the absence of air quality improvements)  
351 but does not further differentiate between scenarios (e.g. high CO<sub>2</sub> FFI emissions could occur with low  
352 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions if air quality improvements occur but emissions mitigation does not).

353 All halogenated GHG emissions are infilled using the “RMS Closest” method of silicone. As suggested,  
354 this selects the emissions of the desired greenhouse gas from the AR6 scenario based on the scenario  
355 that minimizes the root-mean-square error between the time series of (reconstructed) CO<sub>2</sub> FFI emissions  
356 from the RFF-SP scenario and the AR6 scenario. For some of the more major hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)  
357 and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) that are individually modelled by several IAM groups, the AR6 infiller  
358 database is used. In contrast, emissions for more minor gases and all ozone-depleting substances are  
359 not generally available in IAMs and therefore the set of eight SSP scenarios that drive the CMIP6 Earth  
360 System models and were prepared on global annual mean emissions timeseries for the Reduced Model  
361 Intercomparison Project (RCMIP; Nicholls et al. 2020, 2021) are used. FaIR uses NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from the  
362 aviation sector as a proxy for radiative forcing from contrails and contrail-induced cirrus, and this data is  
363 also infilled from the SSP scenarios using the RMS Closest method.

364 In addition, the AR6 and SSP scenarios only run to 2100, whereas we require emissions to 2300. We  
365 follow the logic discussed in Meinshausen et al. (2020) to extend SSP emissions beyond 2100. If CO<sub>2</sub> FFI  
366 emissions are positive in 2100, they are linearly ramped down to zero by 2250; if they are negative, they  
367 are ramped up to zero by 2150. CO<sub>2</sub> AFOLU emissions are ramped to zero by 2150 whether negative or  
368 positive in 2100. For CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O and short-lived forcers, the FFI component (always positive) is ramped  
369 down to zero by 2250, and the AFOLU component is held constant at 2100 emissions. As IAM scenario  
370 data does not provide the FFI/AFOLU split for non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, we estimate this from the average of  
371 the 2100 ratios in SSP scenarios that do have this granularity. Finally, minor greenhouse gases with no  
372 assumed AFOLU source are ramped down to their pre-industrial emissions level by 2250. Historical  
373 emissions from 1750-2014 are provided from RCMIP and for the period 2015-2020 we follow RFF-SP and  
374 use SSP2-4.5.

375 The final set of 10,000 infilled, complete RFF-SP emissions scenarios are then run using a 1001-member  
376 probabilistic ensemble of a state-of-the-art simple climate model: the Finite amplitude Impulse  
377 Response model (FaIR v2.1) (Leach et al. 2021). The FaIR calibration we use (v1.0; Smith 2023) is

378 consistent with the IPCC AR6 Working Group 1 assessment of present-day warming, equilibrium climate  
379 sensitivity, transient climate response, present-day aerosol radiative forcing, present-day CO<sub>2</sub>  
380 concentrations, and recent-past ocean heat content change, including the uncertainties in these  
381 distributions (Forster et al. 2021; Smith et al. 2021), maintains a root-mean-square error between  
382 modelled and observed global mean surface temperature of less than 0.16°C in each ensemble member,  
383 and is consistent with historical emissions from RCMIP. We use stochastic, auto-correlated internal  
384 variability in temperature and forcing following Cummins et al. (2020). For comparison to the RFF-SP  
385 dataset, we also run the SSP scenarios under the same calibration for comparison. RCP scenarios also  
386 use this calibration but are additionally redrawn to historical emissions of short-lived forcers (Skeie et al.  
387 2011).

388 The coupled combination of 10,000 RFF-SP emissions scenarios, run with a 1001-member climate  
389 parameter ensemble, creates 10,010,000 total outcomes  
390 (<https://zenodo.org/record/7759089#.ZGI7kqXMK3C>). Result data for each emissions scenario are saved  
391 as a netCDF file and includes ensemble-level information about global mean surface temperature,  
392 effective radiative forcing, ocean-heat content, and concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O. Uncertainty  
393 ranges are produced for temperature and radiative forcing and are defined by the following 3  
394 classifications: “total uncertainty” represents the uncertainty range of all 10,010,000 outcomes,  
395 “emissions uncertainty” represents the uncertainty range of median values for each climate parameter  
396 ensemble member, and “climate uncertainty” represents the uncertainty range associated with a single  
397 central emissions scenario. Uncertainty ranges are constrained by the 5<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles for the  
398 years 2020 through 2300.

399

#### 400 **Code and data availability**

401 RFF-SP emissions scenarios are available from <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5898729>.

402 The AR6 Working Group 3 infilling database is available from <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6390768>  
403 (registration required).

404 RCMIP emissions prepared for the SSP scenarios are available from  
405 <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4589756>.

406 FaIR v2.1 is available from <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7459702> and v1.0 of the calibration is  
407 available from (<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7545157>).

408 The probabilistic FaIR output is available from <https://zenodo.org/record/7838148> and code at  
409 <https://github.com/chrisroadmap/rff-fair2.1>.

410 The code for FaIR/Figure processing scripts is at  
411 [https://github.com/erysimumcap/RCM\\_RCP8.5\\_Probability](https://github.com/erysimumcap/RCM_RCP8.5_Probability)

412

#### 413 **Acknowledgments**

414 This research was funded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under contract  
415 #68HERH19D0027. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily  
416 represent the views or policies of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

417

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