

Strengthening tropical cyclones are associated
with more frequent hazardous material pipeline
failures in the Eastern US

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Abstract

Over 30,000 hazardous material pipeline (HMP) failures have caused nearly \$11 billion in damages since 1970. Tropical cyclones, which cause more infrastructure damage than all other forms of natural disasters combined, are under-reported causes of HMP failures, largely due to historic policy around pipeline failure reporting. This study defines tropical cyclone-associated HMP failure frequency based on spatiotemporal concomitance while detrending for background HMP failure rates. The relationship between the likelihood and frequency of HMP failures and tropical cyclone intensity is characterized. Since 1975, the annual frequency of tropical cyclone-associated pipeline failures has increased by an order of magnitude. Storm intensity is significantly related to the frequency of HMP failures, explaining 32% of spatial variability and 38% of inter-annual variability in local storm-level pipeline failure frequency. Since 1970, the average annual maximum tropical cyclone intersecting with HMP infrastructure has increased from a Category 3 to a Category 4 storm on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale. Assuming near-term conservation of historical meteorological trends, 200-500% increases in the number of pipeline failures occurring during the annual average maximum tropical cyclone are projected across the Eastern US by 2050. Implications of accurate natural hazards-related cause attribution on HMP failure incident reports are discussed.

Introduction

1 The United States' onshore hazardous material pipeline (HMP) network, span-
2 ning over 3.3 million miles, is a critical component of the nation's energy in-
3 frastructure. The majority of petroleum products used in the United States
4 are transported through the HMP network. National dependence on HMPs has
5 driven a nearly 14% expansion of pipeline in the past eight years ([1]) with an
6 almost 30 million barrels per day increase in HMP transport projected by 2040
7 ([2]). Despite the benefits of HMP infrastructure, HMP infrastructure failures,
8 which cause unintended discharge of petroleum products into the environment,
9 are associated with devastating economic, environmental, and social costs ([3,
10 4]). Over 30,000 HMP failures have been reported in the United States since
11 1970. Between 2005-2023, reported HMP failures were associated with 274 fat-
12 alities, 1,120 injuries, and nearly \$11 billion in damages ([5]). Between 28-95%
13 of the total costs of pipeline failures are associated with environmental damage
14 and remediation ([6, 7]), yet even with the large price tag, about 85% of products
15 released remain unrecovered after remediation ([7, 8]), leading to long-lasting
16 ecological and public health impacts.

17 In 1968, the Pipeline Safety Act mandated and outlined the requirements
18 for reporting hazardous material pipeline (HMP) failures ([5, 9, 10]). This
19 regulation requires pipeline operators to report HMP failures within 30 days
20 of occurrence, providing accident-specific details such as location, facilities in-
21 volved, operations, personnel conduct, and the cause of the incident. When
22 reporting HMP failure cause, pipeline operators have historically selected a sin-
23 gle cause from pre-defined categories, including corrosion, excavation damage,
24 external forces, material or weld failures, equipment malfunctions, and incorrect
25 operation. "Natural forces" was added as a causal category on HMP incidence
26 reporting forms in 2002 (Text S1). In reality, HMP failures frequently result
27 from the interaction of multiple contributing factors (for example natural force
28 failures are more likely when there is underlying corrosion). Single-category
29 cause attribution in mandated reporting therefore limits analysis of complex or
30 interacting drivers of HMP failures ([11–13]).

31 Though estimates vary widely, meteorological events, specifically tropical
32 storms and hurricanes (tropical cyclones, TCs), are reported to contribute sig-
33 nificantly to total damages associated with natural-hazard triggered pipeline
34 accidents in the United States ([14]), and have been estimated to be the cause
35 of up to 86% of all natural-hazard mediated pipeline failures worldwide ([12]).
36 While the true magnitude of natural-hazard-associated pipeline failures in the
37 United States is difficult to estimate due to reporting bias ([15]), TCs are broadly
38 understood to be an important, and under-characterized, driver of HMP failures
39 ([12, 15]).

40 As average ocean temperatures across the Atlantic Basin continue to increase
41 due to climate change ([16–18]), TCs, which are fueled by warm ocean temper-
42 atures, have increased in intensity ([19–21]). Previous research shows that the
43 most damaging tropical cyclones—those categorized as three or higher—are re-
44 sponsible for approximately 85% of the total TC damages, even though they

45 constitute 24% of landfalling storms ([22]). These extreme events are particu-
46 larly challenging to simulate accurately in gridded climate models (e.g. [23]),
47 leading to inconclusive findings in numerical studies on how anthropogenic cli-
48 mate change will impact the most powerful TCs. However, historical data anal-
49 ysis indicates a significant increase in the occurrence of high-intensity storms
50 in particular as a result of sea surface temperature increases (Text S6, [19, 20,
51 24]).

52 Regulatory bodies across the world target HMP design standards on building
53 network resilience to natural disasters, such as earthquakes in California ([25])
54 and tsunamis in Japan ([26]). TC storm tracks impact 19 US states, overlap-
55 ping with some of the densest HMP infrastructure in North America (Fig 1a,
56 [5]). TCs can stress pipeline systems through a variety of mechanisms, including
57 but not limited to mechanical stress from high wind speeds; intense precipita-
58 tion and related impacts including compound flooding; shifting and settling of
59 rapidly saturated soils; erosion, accretion, and landslides; storm surges and re-
60 lated coastal impacts; and intensified tornado activity inland ([27–29]). Some of
61 these stresses are acute, and can logically be associated with pipeline failure at
62 low latency. For example, TC-associated tornado damage to an above-ground
63 transmission pipeline is easily attributable to an individual storm event ([10,
64 30]). Many of these stresses are cumulative and can result in a decreased overall
65 lifetime of the pipe system. For instance, a pipeline network subject to frequent
66 bouts of wetting and drying due to TC-related precipitation in regions with high
67 shrink-swell potential could undergo significant mechanical stress ([31, 32]); and
68 pipelines impacted by saline storm surges coastally could experience more rapid
69 rates of corrosion over time ([33, 34]). While impacts of high wind speeds
70 and intense rainfall are universal, TCs interact with local soils, land cover, to-
71 pography, and microclimate to generate different impacts on infrastructure in
72 different regions of the United States. Coastal regions (Texas Coast, Mississippi
73 Delta, Southeast Coast) will experience effects of storm surges ([35, 36]); flat
74 regions (High Plains, Southeast Coast, Midwest) may see tornado activity [35,
75 37]); hilly regions (Northeast) may see compounding flooding, including coastal,
76 riverine, and flash flooding and landslides ([38, 39]); and the High Plains, Texas,
77 and Mississippi Delta region will likely be additionally impacted by high shrink-
78 swell potential of local soils saturated with intense rain over large geographic
79 reaches ([40, 41]).

80 To inform dialogue on engineering standards for HMP failure reporting, de-
81 sign, and maintenance in hurricane-prone regions in the 21st century, the ob-
82 jective of this study is to quantify associations between trends in HMP failure
83 frequencies and observed increases in TC intensity (TCI, the first principal com-
84 ponent of maximum sustained near-surface windspeed and minimum se-level
85 pressure) associated with climate change. As there are no historical records of
86 TC associated storm failures available through the PHMSA, we identify HMP
87 failures that have occurred after exposure to TCs, while detrending for back-
88 ground regional failure rates unassociated with storms. Utilizing a simple mod-
89 eling framework that can control for, and quantify the relative importance of,
90 unparameterized spatiotemporal drivers of HMP failure, we estimate the extent

91 to which increases in TCI observed in the last 50 years are associated with in-
92 creased TC-related failure frequencies (Text S2 and S3, Figure 1b) during the
93 same time period. We confirm conclusions from the literature [12–14, 35] sug-
94 gesting that the average annual maximum storm intersecting with HMP infras-
95 tructure has increased from a Category 3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane
96 Scale in 1970 to a Category 4 in 2010. In the absence of robust numerical mod-
97 els, we resort to extrapolating from this trend to assume a linear increase in TCI
98 associated with increasing sea surface temperatures in the subtropical Atlantic
99 up until 2050, when regional SSTs are projected to reach the 26.5°C threshold
100 after which thermodynamic intensification of TCs is expected to "saturate" and
101 break from linear trends ([42]). Assuming near-term continuation of observed
102 linear trends implies that the average annual maximum storm intersecting with
103 HMP infrastructure will be a Category 5 by 2050 (Text S6). Our models sug-
104 gest that HMP failures are both more significantly more likely, and exponential
105 more frequent, as storm intensity increases. These results underscore the signif-
106 icance of meaningful design interventions to stabilize HMPs in TC regions, and
107 suggest that TCs need to be attributable as contributing causes of HMP failure
108 on incidence reporting forms for accurate attribution.

Results

Pipeline Failure Attribution Analysis

109 Between 1986 and 2022, pipeline failures in the PHMSA dataset were cate-
110 gorized as resulting from natural forces (4.3%, or 275 failures), human error
111 (14.9%, or 943 failures), and external forces (80.8%, or 5,124 failures). The first
112 recorded pipeline failure attributed to "natural forces" appeared in 2002 when
113 the category was introduced, with no significant positive or negative trends in
114 the frequency of this attribution observed since then (Figure S1). In contrast,
115 significant ($p < 0.01$) positive trends were noted in the annual frequency of
116 failures attributed to human error (an increase of 1.33 failures per year) and
117 external forces (an increase of 1.45 failures per year) over the same period (Fig-
118 ure S1). Spatiotemporal characteristics of pipeline network (including but not
119 limited to the total length of pipeline in a region, the rate at which regional
120 pipeline networks are expanding, and aging pipe) will influence current and fu-
121 ture regional baseline and HMP failure frequencies. To account for regional
122 differences in HMP infrastructure (such as pipeline density), as well as regional
123 differences in TC dynamics, we divided the study area into six spatial subre-
124 gions using K-means clustering on latitude and longitude (Figure 1a, Text S1).
125 In all models, we set random intercepts to these location groups, as well as to
126 individual years, to control for spatiotemporal non-independence in the data
127 that could bias our estimators.

128 Although PHMSA reports attribute a relatively low percentage of pipeline
129 failures to "natural forces," our analysis found that 32.5% of HMP failures in
130 the TC intersecting region occur within 60 days of TC exposure (Figure S2),




Figure 1: a. Six spatial sub-regions where HMP infrastructure (major crude oil and natural gas transmission pipelines, [43]) intersect with tropical cyclone storm tracks (TCs) in the continental United States. b. Time series of f_s (points) and f_o (lines) by spatial region. Points above the grey polygon represent storm-related HMP failures, or f'_s . c. For each spatial sub-region, table indicates total 1970-2022 f'_s , maximum TC windspeed, length of crude oil pipeline, and length of natural gas pipeline. Here "MI Delta" refers to "Mississippi Delta"

131 which serves as our temporal cutoff point for a TC-associated HMP failure (Text
 132 S1). Over the study period, we observed a significant positive linear trend in
 133 the annual frequency of failures occurring within 60 days of TC exposure (the
 134 regional TC-associated failure frequency, or f_s , Eq. 1). Drawing from this trend,
 135 in 1975, the annual mean f_s in the Eastern US was 4 TC associated failures; by
 136 2020, this number had risen to 50 failures per year (Figure S3). As trends in f_s
 137 will be associated with both failures related to TC, as well background failures
 138 that would have occurred regardless of TC exposure, we also quantify the local,
 139 time-dependent background failure frequency (f_o , Eq. 2, Figure 1b), and define
 140 the TC-related failure frequency (f'_s), as f_s minus the time-dependent regional
 141 60-day background failure frequency (f_o , Eq. 3, Figure 1b).

142 The highest total number of TC-related HMP failures (f'_s) were observed on
 143 the Texas coast, followed by the Mississippi Delta and Northeast regions; where
 144 high-magnitude TCs (indicated by wind speed) intersect with dense crude and
 145 natural gas pipelines (Figure 1c). More frequent f'_s are observed in the second
 146 half of the study period relative to the first in the Mississippi Delta and Texas
 147 coast, indicative of a trend in these regions (Figure 1b). Higher pipeline failure
 148 per unit length of crude oil pipeline is observed in the Northeast than other

149 regions (Figure 1c). High magnitude f'_s is observed in High Plains, despite
150 lower maximum TC wind speed (Figure 1b,c). The Southeast returns few f'_s
151 relative to high TC wind speeds, likely because of a lack of crude oil pipeline
152 infrastructure in the region, and frequent number of storms (Figure 1c).

153 To evaluate whether more the intensity of TCs modifies the likelihood of
154 at least one HMP failure, we utilized a mixed-effects logistic regression model
155 predicting the likelihood of at least one f'_s per region for a storm, with random
156 intercepts on region and year. TC intensity (or TCI, calculated as the first
157 principal component of the maximum sustained near-surface windspeed and
158 minimum sea-level pressure of all storm HURDAT2 points intersecting with
159 with a spatial subregion) is a statistically significant predictor of one or more
160 HMP failures for a given region (at $\alpha=0.05$), with the likelihood of one or more
161 failure increasing by 59% for a standard deviation increase in TCI (Text S7,
162 Figure S7a). This indicates that with a TCI of zero, approximately equal to
163 the interface between a tropical cyclone and Category 1 hurricane on the Saffir-
164 Simpson hurricane scale (Fig 3c), the probability of at least on HMP failure
165 is about 20%. According to this model, the probability of at least on failure
166 increases to 31% for a Category 2 storm, 38% for a Category 3 storm, 49% for
167 a Category 4 storm, and 64% for a Category 5 storm. TCI explains minimal
168 inter-annual variance (v) in the likelihood of one or more HMP failure (0.2%),
169 but explains 21.8% of the regional variance (u) (Figure S7b,c), suggesting that
170 variable TCI explains about 22% of the spatial variability in the likelihood of
171 at least one HMP failure. The likelihood of TC-related HMP failure is higher
172 in the Mississippi Delta, Texas Coast, and Northeast region (Figure S7b).

173 Nested mixed-effects Poisson regression models characterize how TCI modi-
174 fies the frequency of pipeline failures, while controlling for spatiotemporal non-
175 independence in the data with random intercepts on year and location. TCI is a
176 statistically significant (at $\alpha < 0.001$) predictor increased frequency of pipeline
177 failures f'_s , with an incidence rate ratio of 1.54 averaged across the region. If we
178 look at how this translates to f'_s in Texas, for example, this suggests that the
179 after failure frequency for a Category 1 storm is about 5. This increases to 9 f'_s
180 for a Category 2 storm; 15 f'_s for a Category 3 storm; 28 f'_s for a Category 4
181 storm; and 63 f'_s for a Category 5 storm. Adding TCI explains 24% of variance
182 in location (u) and 34% of residual variance in year (v) (Figure 2a, Text S8). In
183 the null model, inter-annual variance in f'_s (v) was 141% greater than regional
184 variance (u) implying that inter-annual variability in f'_s for a given location is
185 greater than regional variability in f'_s within a given year.

186 In the null model, u_j and v_k indicate anomalies in f'_s from year to year and
187 location to location. Shifts in u_j and v_k between a null model (no fixed effects)
188 and the full model (containing TCI as a fixed effect) indicate inter-regional and
189 inter-annual variability in how f'_s responds to TCI (Figure 2b,c). In the null
190 model, the highest u_j , corresponding to the highest regional average regional
191 f'_s , is observed along the Texas Coast, followed by the Mississippi Delta and
192 the High Plains. The lowest u_j , corresponding the lowest f'_s for a region, are
193 observed in the Southeast and in the Midwest. Negative shifts in u_j in the Texas
194 Coast and Mississippi Delta with TCI parameterized suggests that a substantial

195 portion of the high f'_s observed in this region is explained by increased TCI. A
196 positive shift in u_j in the High Plains suggests that the global coefficient on
197 TCI may lead to an underestimation of TC-related pipeline failures (f'_s) for
198 low-intensity TCs, which most frequently present in the region (Fig 1b). A
199 positive shift in the negative u_j in the Midwest suggests that lower (f'_s) in the
200 region is partially explained explained by lower TCI in the Midwest, relative to
201 other regions (Figure 2b).

202 The random intercept on year (v_k) in the null model likewise indicates the
203 relative anomaly in (f'_s) for a given year. Evaluating the color scale, we observe
204 14 out of 20 of the latest years (2002-2022) with a positive v_k , and only 6 out of
205 the 20 latest years with a negative v_k , indicating a trend towards increasing f'_s
206 over time. Reduction in the absolute value of v_k between null and full models
207 highlight years when TCI explains anomalies in f'_s . Strong negative shifts are
208 observed in positive intercepts in 2014, 2005, 2017, 1992, and 2012, suggesting
209 that TCI explained more of the anomalously high (f'_s) in these years (Figure
210 2c, Text S9).

Trends in Tropical Cyclone Dynamics

211 Between 1977 and 2022, 579 out of 729 tropical cyclones (TCs) in the NOAA
212 HURDAT2 Atlantic Basin database intersected with HMP infrastructure (HMP
213 intersecting TC) in the Central and Eastern United States. For each year,
214 the strongest HMP intersecting TC is identified. There is evidence that the
215 strongest annual HMP intersected TC is getting stronger over time. Since 1975,
216 a significant positive linear trend in components of TCI (maximum sustained
217 near-surface windspeed and minimum sea-level pressure) are observed. That the
218 annual maximum sustained HMP-intersecting TC windspeed has been increas-
219 ing by about 0.6 knots per year since 1975, corresponding to a 27.6 knot increase
220 over the 46 study period. To put this number in perspective, the difference in
221 windspeed between a Category 2 storm and a Category 4 storm on the Saffir
222 Simpson hurricane scale is 18 knots. Similarly, we observe a significant negative
223 linear trend in annual minimum TC pressure (where decreasing pressures indi-
224 cate increasing storm intensity) by -0.7 mBar per year (Fig 4a-b). This result is
225 unsurprising given that maximum windspeed and minimum pressure are highly
226 collinear.

227 Drawing from these trends, the annual maximum wind speed and mini-
228 mum pressure of an HMP intersecting TC in 1970 was approximately 107 knots
229 and 954 mBar, respectively; corresponding to a Category 3 hurricane on the
230 Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. In 2010, the annual maximum wind speed and
231 minimum pressure of an HMP intersecting TC were 130 knots and 928 mBar,
232 respectively; corresponding to a Category 4 hurricane. Projecting this trend to
233 2050 produces an estimated annual maximum wind speed and minimum pres-
234 sure of 154 knots and 902 mBar, respectively; corresponding to a Category
235 5 storm (Figure 3c, yellow bars). 2050 projections are presented for illustra-
236 tive purposes only. Linear interpolation of hurricane strength based on time,
237 when we assume that the physical driver of this increase in strength is increas-




Figure 2: a) Mixed-effects Poisson model parameters and statistics for null (no fixed effects) and full (TCI as a fixed effect) models, b) caterpillar plot of random intercept (points) on location for null (open circles) and full (closed circles) models, with error bar representing 95% confidence interval; color scale indicating location group c) as in b but for random intercept on year, with color scale indicating advancing year. Here, "MI Delta" refers to "Mississippi Delta".

238 ing sea surface temperatures under climate change, rests on physically flawed
239 assumptions (Text S6) . Incidentally, significant southeastern shifts in origin
240 coordinates of the annual maximum TC intersecting with HMP infrastructure
241 (corresponding to a 0.15 degrees/year southerly and 0.41 degree/year easterly
242 shift) were also observed, consistent with the literature (e.g [44], Figure S9).
243 Projected maximum annual TCs represent the highest-magnitude storm that
244 could be expected to impact the Gulf Coast regions (Texas coast, Mississippi
245 Delta, and Southeast) on an annual basis, and corresponding f'_s projections for
246 the annual maximum TC are indicated on Figure 3c.

247 Projecting from local trends in TCI, the Mississippi Delta and Texas Gulf
248 Coast regions are projected to see an over 5-fold increase in the frequency HMP
249 failure associated with the local annual maximum TC (f'_s associated with the TC
250 with the highest windspeed per location group); the High Plains is projected
251 to see a four-fold increase in f'_s with the annual maximum TC by 2050, the
252 Northeast a nearly 3 fold increase in f'_s with the annual maximum TC , and the
253 Southeast and Northeast are expected to see a doubling f'_s per annual maximum
254 TC by 2050 (Figure 3d). These projections suggests a 200-500% increase in
255 HMP failure frequency, independent of drivers of background HMP failures such
256 as increased pipe age or length (f_o), associated with the local annual maximum
257 TC across the Eastern US in 2050.

Discussion

258 TC-related HMP failure (f'_s) are more likely, and exponentially more frequent,
259 for stronger hurricanes. The greatest TCI related increases in f'_s are observed
260 along the Texas and Mississippi coasts, regions with dense crude oil pipeline
261 infrastructure, high shrink-swell potential of local soils, and exposure to coastal
262 storm surges and high-intensity TCs ([6, 15]). Increased frequency of f'_s associ-
263 ated with even small shifts in TCI is observed in the High Plains, where only
264 low-intensity storms have occurred, indicating sensitivity of High Plains HMP
265 infrastructure to intensity- invariant impacts of TCs, such as associated tornado
266 activity and interactions between intense precipitation and high shrink-swell po-
267 tential of local soils, which can put significant mechanical stress on underground
268 pipeline networks ([31, 32, 41]). Lack of crude oil pipeline infrastructure equates
269 to a significant reduction in overall HMP pipeline failure associated with extreme
270 events on the Southeast coast, despite exposure to frequent, intense TCs (Figure
271 1, 3c).

272 Significant linear trends are observed in the strength of the annual maximum
273 TCI during the study period indicate that the annual maximum TC intersecting
274 with HMP infrastructure has increased from a Category 3 to a Category 4 be-
275 tween 1970-2010. Linear trends in TCI noted here are both notable in terms of
276 their magnitude and in terms of their consistency with previous research ([45-
277 48]). In using this observed trend to predict the strength of the future annual
278 maximum storms, we make important assumptions about the physical drivers
279 of TCs. The first assumption is that hurricanes are powered by temperature




Figure 3: Linear trends in 1975-2022 annual maximum HMP intersecting a) maximum sustained near-surface windspeed and b) minimum sea-level pressure. c) Poisson projected f'_s (Eq 3) by region (color), with range of observed historical regional TCI indicated by solid lines and out-of-sample projections indicated with dashed lines. Inverted triangle, diamond, and triangle symbols correspond to the annual maximum regional TCI projected from linear trends for 1970, 2010, and 2050 (Fig S6). Yellow bars represented maximum projected HMP intersecting TCI for 1970 (left), 2010 (center), and 2050 (right); extrapolated from linear trends observed 1975-2022 (Figure 2a,b). Dashed vertical gray lines represent storm classification thresholds on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, with corresponding storm classification indicated as text along top of figure. Table 3d contains projected f'_s by region for 1970, 2010, and 2050 maximum annual HMP infrastructure intersecting TCI (yellow bars). Here, "MI Delta" refers to "Mississippi Delta".

280 differences between the warm sea surface and the cold upper atmosphere. There
281 is scientific consensus on this principle (e.g. [49]). The second assumption is
282 that sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the subtropical Atlantic, where Atlantic
283 TCs originate, are increasing because of anthropogenic climate change. There
284 is emerging scientific consensus backing this assumption, with multiple studies
285 documenting robust trends in SSTs over time ([50–52]), in line with what would
286 be expected from physics-based coupled earth systems models ([53, 54]). The
287 third assumption is that the historical relationship between SST and hurricane
288 strength will remain non-stationary over time. There is strong physical evidence
289 countering the realism of this assumption. First, there are thermodynamic lim-
290 its to SST-associated TC strength increases over time: climate change is driving
291 both increases in SST and increases in temperatures in the upper atmosphere,
292 reducing the vertical temperature contrast that drives TC formation ([42, 49]).
293 In numerical models, once subtropical Atlantic SSTs get above a certain thresh-
294 old (26.5°C), a "saturation" of this TC strengthening effect is noted, and SST
295 warming yields smaller increases in TC strength ([42]). This is both due to
296 energy limitations to atmospheric vapor storage, and because climate change
297 is also modifying other atmospheric drivers and constraints of hurricane forma-
298 tion, such as wind shear, humidity levels, and vertical stability; all which impact
299 TC formation and propagation in complex ways ([55]). Finally, not all of the
300 energy from increasing SSTs will be dissipated as increased windspeeds in TCs.
301 Increased energy available for TCs may mean that storms may become more
302 numerous (though evidence for this is lacking in the historical record), larger,
303 more persistent, or may deliver more intense rainfall ([24]).

304 In the absence of a robust alternative, we extrapolate from observed linear
305 trends in maximum annual windspeed and minimum annual pressure twenty-five
306 years into the future (to 2050). Our justification is this: the subtropical Atlantic
307 SST has been increasing at a rate of about 0.4°C per decade since 1993 ([56]).
308 Assuming current mean SST of 25 °C in the subtropical Atlantic, we would
309 expect to be approaching the temperature range associated with "saturation"
310 of impacts of SST-driven strengthening of TCs around 2050 ([55]). It is in
311 this near-term window, where evidence suggests that trends may hold, that we
312 project the annual maximum storm intersecting with HMP infrastructure to
313 increase to a Category 5 storm by 2050.

314 At existing levels we see an exponential increases in f'_s with increasing TC
315 strength, any continuation of the trend towards increasing strength in the an-
316 nual maximum TC may markedly increase HMP failure frequency. Increasing
317 trends in TC-related HMP failure across the United States suggest that these
318 increases are associated with both increased vulnerability of HMP infrastructure
319 to TC impacts (indicated by linear trends in v_k and some weak trends in f_o ,
320 particularly in Texas, Figure 1b), and increasing intensity of TCs intersecting
321 with HMP infrastructure (indicated by linear trends in TCI, Figure 2a,b). There
322 are multiple potential pipeline-side drivers of increase in both f_o and f'_s over
323 time that are independent of increasing TC intensity, most notably increasing
324 age of pipeline infrastructure and expanding networks (meaning that both base-
325 line and TC associated pipeline failures are more likely simply because there is

326 more pipeline to fail). Reports of HMP failures due to all causes have increased
327 markedly in the last fifty years (Figure S1), indicating the growing scope and
328 vulnerability of this essential infrastructure system. Most pipelines in operation
329 today have surpassed 45 years of service, a threshold associated with greater
330 risk of failure ([57]).

331 These findings underscore the vulnerability of pipeline infrastructure to trop-
332 ical cyclones (TCs) in general, and major hurricanes in particular. Although
333 natural force damage accounts for only 4.3% of total failures in the PHMSA
334 dataset, we identified that 32.5% of failures in US regions impacted by TC
335 storm tracks occur within 60 days of a TC intersection (Figure S2), and we
336 see that more frequent failures 60 days after a TC intersection are significantly
337 and positively related to TCI, after detrending for non-storm associated fail-
338 ure rates. This provides new data to back previous claims in the literature of
339 under-reporting of TC-related HMP failures ([15]). TC intensity is a statisti-
340 cally significant predictor of both the likelihood and frequency of HMP failures
341 during a storm, with failure frequency increasing exponentially with increasing
342 TCI. This indicates potentially significant exposure to pipeline infrastructure
343 under major hurricanes in particular, and suggests that an increase in intensity
344 of the annual maximum storm is potentially a more impactful variable with
345 regards to predicting future frequency of pipeline failure than an increase in the
346 total number of storms ([24]). Historical data indicates that the annual maxi-
347 mum hurricane intersecting with hazardous material pipeline has increased from
348 a Category 3 storm in 1970 to a Category 4 storm in 2010. Projecting this trend
349 implies that a Category 5 hurricane can be expected to intersect with HMP in-
350 frastructure approximately annually by 2050, with strong implications for future
351 HMP failure frequency across the eastern United States. Our results are consis-
352 tent with current consensus that major hurricanes (category 3 or greater) has
353 increased in observational records in the past fifty years ([24, 46, 58, 59]).

354 Though limited by the nature of HMP incident reporting data and well-
355 resolved numerical prediction so future Atlantic TC dynamics, these findings
356 strongly supports conclusions from previous research suggesting that TC-associated
357 impacts to HMP infrastructure are under-reported in regulatory record keeping
358 as well as in the scientific literature (e.g.[14]), and stress the need for tailored risk
359 assessments that incorporate complex contributions of natural hazards forcings,
360 including TC forcings, to HMP failure occurrence in incident reports. Given
361 the costs of HMP failures in terms of health, environment, and economic dam-
362 ages, identifying HMP failures associated with TCs are critical to administration
363 of appropriate relief during national emergencies, as well as to improving the
364 accuracy of our accounting of financial damages associated with TC events.
365 If collected, such data could lend insight to improved preparedness measures
366 and targeted mitigation strategies that are essential for safeguarding critical
367 infrastructure against the increasing risks posed by expanding, aging pipeline
368 networks intersecting with intensifying TCs under climate change.

Methods

Data Preparation

369 This analysis aims to identify TC-associated pipeline failures in the PHMSA
370 database [5]. Prior to 2002, "natural force damages" was not a causal category
371 on incident forms, and post-2002, there is suggested negative reporting bias to
372 this causal category (Text S1, Figure S1, [14]). All data and code comprising
373 this analysis are available online (see SI, [60]). We examine intersections be-
374 tween PHMSA Failure Data (HMP failures) and 6-hourly points in the NOAA
375 HURDAT2 Dataset (TC points, [61]). We merge the datasets by identifying
376 records where HMP failure coordinates fall within the tropical cyclone force
377 diameter (calculated from 34 kt wind radii maximum extent) or, prior to 2004
378 when the force diameter is unavailable, within a 300 mile (the approximate
379 average tropical cyclone force diameter in the HURDAT 2 database). Addition-
380 ally, the failures must occur within 60 days of the TC point intersection, where
381 we observe a local inflection in the histogram of latency between HMP failures
382 and TC intesection (Text S1, Figure S2). Before merging, all HMP failures
383 and TC points that fall outside the North American TC storm track region are
384 discarded. If HMP failures do not intersect with any TC points, they are asso-
385 ciated with a year specific no-storm identifier. Likewise, TC points that do not
386 intersect with HMP failure points are retained as records in the merged HMP
387 x TC database with no affiliated HMP failure points (Text S1). To account
388 for regional variations in hazardous material pipeline (HMP) failure rates due
389 to factors unrelated to tropical cyclones (e.g., local pipeline construction prac-
390 tices, network length and density, network age, ambient geophysical conditions,
391 and use characteristics), we applied k-means clustering to the latitude and lon-
392 gitude of all records in the merged HMP x TC database to define six spatial
393 sub-regions, each one approximately 300 miles in diameter (Text S1, Figure 1a,
394 [62]).

395 The merged TC by HMP dataset, which contains records of TCs with no
396 associated HMP failure points, TCs associated with individual HMP failure
397 points, and HMP failure points unassociated with storms, is then aggregated by
398 summing on storm name and region, providing the frequency of HMP failures
399 per TC and per spatial subregion ($f_s^{(i,j,y)}$ or f_s):

$$f_s^{(i,j,y)} = \sum_x \sum_{j'} \sum_{k'} \eta^{(x,i,j',k')} \delta_{j,j'} \quad (1)$$

400 Where x is the index for a record in the merged HMP x TC database; i is the
401 TC intersecting x (with $i^* = 0$ reserved for no storm intersection, see Eq 2); j'
402 is the spatial subregion of x (defined by k-means cluster), and k' is the year of
403 x .

404 We assume that f_s will include some failures that would have occurred re-
405 gardless of TC intersection. To adjust for this effect, we define the "background
406 failure frequency" for each location $f_o^{(j,y)}$ as the average 60 day failure frequency
407 unassociated with TC intersections, and allow it to vary over time (as several

408 key drivers of pipeline failure vulnerability are increasing over time, (e.g., in-
 409 creasing pipe age, increasing pipe length). The "background failure frequency"
 410 (f_o) is defined as the 5-year 60-day average failure frequency when $i = 0$ (no
 411 storm intersection) for each sub-region ($j = 1, \dots, 6$) for each approximately
 412 five-year period ($Y = 1, \dots, 9$) between 1972 and 2022:

$$f_o^{(j,y)} = \frac{60}{N(Y_y)} \sum_x \sum_{j'} \sum_{k' \in Y_y} \eta^{(x,i^*,j',k')} \delta_{j,j'} \quad (2)$$

413 Here Y_y is the set of years in the y^{th} 5-year period between 1972 and 2022
 414 (bounded by years 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2022), i^*
 415 specifically refers to no TC affiliation, and $N(Y_y)$ is the total number of days in
 416 Y_y . The storm-related failure frequency ($f_s'^{(i,j,y)}$ or f_s') is then defined as the
 417 and subtracted from each storm-associated frequency ($f_s^{(i,j,y)}$), resulting in the
 418 storm-related failure frequency ($f_s'^{(i,j,y)}$, Eq. 3):

$$f_s'^{(i,j,y)} = \max\left(f_s^{(i,j,y)} - f_o^{(j,y)}, 0\right) \quad (3)$$

Model Fitting

419 Due to the multilevel nature of the data and the presence of zero values in f_s'
 420 (Eq. 2 and 3), we employed strategically nested mixed-effects logistic (Text S2,
 421 S7) and mixed-effects Poisson regressions (Text S3 and S8; Figure S7; Table S1).
 422 These models used TC intensity (TCI, derived as the first principal component
 423 of regional maximum TC wind speed and regional minimum TC pressure) as the
 424 main predictor variable (Text S1). The mixed-effects Poisson regression allows
 425 us to predict f_s' , a count variable, as a function of TCI, a continuous variable
 426 (Text S3 and S7, Figures S8; Table S2):

$$\log(\lambda_{ijk}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TCI_{ijk} + u_j + v_k + \gamma_j TCI_{ijk} + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (4)$$

427 Here, λ_{ijk} is the expected storm HMP failure frequency for the i -th storm
 428 in the j -th region and k -th year; TCI_{ijk} is TC intensity for the i -th storm in
 429 the j -th region and k -th year; and β_0 is the overall log-rate intercept. β_1 is the
 430 fixed log-rate coefficient for the predictor TCI_{ijk} ; u_j is the random intercept
 431 for region j , capturing the residual deviation of the j -th region from the overall
 432 intercept; v_k is the random intercept for year k , capturing the residual deviation
 433 of the k -th year from the overall intercept; γ_j represents the random log-rate
 434 coefficient local to each region j ; and ϵ_{ijk} is the residual error term. The "full"
 435 model (Eq 4) is compared to a null model with no fixed effects (Eq 5):

$$\log(\lambda_{ijk}) = \beta_0 + u_j + v_k + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (5)$$

436 The panel model structure mitigates variance bias associated with omitted
 437 variables and non-independence of observations ([60, 63]), and the nested panel
 438 model structure (comparing Eq 4 to Eq 5) enables a more detailed examination

439 of how temporal (year) and spatial (region) variability in f'_s is influenced by TCI.
440 The model assumes variance component partitioning between random effects,
441 where $u_j(i) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_j^2)$, $v_k(i) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_k^2)$, and $\epsilon_{ijk} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$ (Text S4,
442 S5).

Estimating Trends and Future Predictions

443 Historical (1970–2022) trends in annual TC minimum sea-level pressure (“pres-
444 sure”) and maximum sustained near-surface wind speed (“windspeed”) were
445 quantified using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. We make a simplified,
446 but necessary, assumption that the linear trends will remain constant until 2050
447 (see discussion and Text S6 for justification and limitations to this approach),
448 and use these models to estimate the 1970, 2010, and 2050 annual maximum
449 TC windspeed and minimum pressure, both globally and for each region (Fig-
450 ure S6). These values are converted to the 1970, 2010, and 2050 TCI using the
451 principal components model trained on historical TC data. TCI values input
452 into the trained Poisson mixed-effects model (Eq 2) to predict storm-associated
453 failure frequency (f'_s) associated with the regional annual maximum TCI for
454 1970, 2010, and 2020.

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Author Contributions

463 **M.S.:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Writing—original draft.
464 **E.C.:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Writing—original draft,
465 Writing-revision, Data curation, Software, Validation, Visualization, Supervi-
466 sion, Project administration.

467

Conflicts of Interest

468 The authors claim no conflicts of interest.

Data availability statement

469 All data and processing code are available on GitHub at <https://github.com/LizCarter492/TCpipeline>
470 .

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