

Half the world's population already experiences a climate 1.5°C warmer than preindustrial

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The world has warmed appreciably over the past two centuries (Fig. 1a). The Paris Agreement commits the world to keeping global mean temperature ‘well-below 2 °C’ above preindustrial¹. This value is a global average and some regions will experience warming much greater than this, for example the Arctic². Such a regional pattern can make it hard for people to associate the global threshold with their local experiences³. The long timescales of climate change provide a further challenge: not only does interannual variability obscure the multi-year average, but the preindustrial reference state was multiple generations ago⁴.

The Paris Agreement does not provide a precise definition of when the preindustrial reference period occurred¹. For practical reasons, it is often taken as the average of 1850–1900 CE^{5,6}, because this is earliest that we have sufficient global coverage of instrumental records. An earlier reference period would be desirable from a radiative forcing perspective⁷, because humans had already noticeably altered the climate system by the early instrumental period^{8,9}. An expert assessment states that the earlier reference period was cooler than the 1850–1900 CE instrumental period^{6,7}, with a subsequent model-based quantification finding it up to 0.1 °C cooler¹⁰. The uncertainty in the amount of warming that has already occurred also differs between the instrumental and earlier baselines¹⁰. The uncertainty in the preindustrial baseline temperature even propagates into the estimate of well-observed years⁷ (Fig. 1b). There is ongoing discussion about the most appropriate definition of the preindustrial baseline^{11,12}. Here we apply the stricter definition of a long-term average climate prior to industrialisation¹⁰ (taken as 1400–1800 CE, Methods), rather than assume the early instrumental period^{5,6} (1850–1900 CE) represents “preindustrial” conditions.

Regional temperature changes are rarely presented with respect to the preindustrial. For example, they were never shown this way in the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report⁵, upon which the Paris Agreement was grounded. The recent IPCC special report⁶ “Global Warming of 1.5 °C” was the first to show temperature plots with respect to a preindustrial baseline. Choosing not to present changes from preindustrial may be justified given the uncertainty in our knowledge of the preindustrial baseline (for example Fig. 1b implies less confidence in warming trend than Fig. 1a). However, it can mislead observers about the magnitude of warming that has occurred. Here we provide and display an ensemble of gridded temperature observations that shows the warming since preindustrial and its uncertainty.

The sparse instrumental coverage prior to the 1950s means that even the state of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation may be ambiguous¹³, despite being the dominant mode of climate variability¹⁴. This means that when calculating regional temperature changes from any preindustrial baseline one must also formally quantify the uncertainties, especially those associated with the regions without instrumental coverage¹⁵. Here we base our dataset on the HadCRUT4 compilation of station observations¹⁶ combined with multi-resolution lattice kriging¹⁵ to retain covariance relationships at global, synoptic and local scales. 10,000 equally-plausible ensemble members represent the observed temperature change, beginning in 1850 CE¹³ (Methods).

Reconstructing the spatial pattern of the warming prior to reliable instrumental coverage (pre-1850 CE) presents a different challenge. The forced component of global warming of the early instrumental period (1850–1900 CE) with respect to 1400–1800 CE has been estimated from a 26-member multi-model ensemble of climate simulations covering the past millennium¹⁰. The global mean warming is often used as an index of climate change, because local changes and many impacts scale approximately linearly with it¹. Unfortunately conventional pattern-scaling tools are not appropriate to expand the global mean offsets spatially, because they either cannot represent cold states prior to the future projections¹⁷ or realistic covariance sampling¹⁸.

Here we adopt a novel pattern-scaling approach that not only reconstructs the mean pattern and local uncertainty, but critically also retains the spatial covariances between locations in its reconstructed patterns (Methods). In brief, an ensemble of scalable patterns were created from the regression slopes of the first 10 empirical orthogonal functions of the merged surface temperatures changes seen in CMIP5 under the RCP2.6 scenario, combined with a residual term. We multiply these scalable patterns by the global mean warming from the preindustrial to the early instrumental¹⁰ and combine with the spatially-complete temperature observations¹³ to create an annual-resolution dataset of local temperature anomalies from the preindustrial along with quantified uncertainties. The median difference in temperature of the preindustrial from the projection reference period of

51 AR5⁵ (1986–2015 CE) is statistically significant across the most of the globe (Fig. 2a).

52 2016 CE was globally the warmest year on record (Fig. 2b, at the time of writing) through the combination of anthropogenic
53 forcing and a very strong El Niño¹⁴. There is a very small probability (3.6%) that the global mean temperature in 2016 CE
54 was 1.5 °C or more above the preindustrial. We stress that the reason this probability exists is because of uncertainty related
55 to the preindustrial reference period, rather than the quality of the temperature observations in 2016 CE (c.f. Fig. 1a,b). The
56 proportion of the globe in 2016 CE with an annual temperature anomaly greater than 1.5 °C was 31.1% (IQR of 27.5-34.9%);
57 and 16.2% (14.1-18.6%) saw temperatures over 2 °C (Fig. 3a, Tab. ??).

58 As well as temperatures rising since the preindustrial, the global population has increased dramatically¹⁹ (Fig. 3b). People
59 are not evenly spread across the globe: the vast majority live on the land, which warms faster the ocean²⁰. Assessing the direct
60 health impacts of the warming requires consideration of only the temperatures to which people are exposed - rather than the
61 global average²¹. The majority of the world's population lives in Asia¹⁹, yet very few live in the portion of it that saw the
62 warmest temperature anomalies in 2016 CE (Siberia was more than 2.5 °C above preindustrial; Fig. 2b).

63 A further major demographic trend over the past two centuries has been the shift to living in towns and cities instead of the
64 countryside¹⁹. Due to the urban heat island effect²², this shift itself will lead to people on average being exposed to higher
65 temperatures. Whilst estimates of the urban heat island effect exist with global coverage²³, information about of their evolution
66 since 1850 CE does not. We therefore incorporate the impact of urbanisation as a time invariant adjustment felt by an increasing
67 proportion of the population (Methods).

68 Combining the temperature dataset with both population information and the urbanisation adjustments allows the number of
69 people living at various warming levels to be determined each year (Fig. 3a; Fig. 4). The total number of people that experience
70 an annual mean temperature at, or below, the preindustrial level in each year has not increased, despite the substantial population
71 growth (Fig. 3a). Whilst as percentage, it has dropped throughout the industrial era and is effectively negligible now (Fig. 4). It
72 is as if all the population growth since industrialisation has occurred at elevated temperatures.

73 The Lancet Countdown²¹ defines one indicator for the health effects of temperature change as the ‘exposure-weighted’
74 average temperature (i.e. the temperature change experienced by a person on average). The report stressed that this indicator
75 increased at double the rate of global (area-weighted) temperature since 2000 CE²¹. The temperature anomaly dataset and
76 urban heat island methodology developed here means it is possible to ‘exposure-weight’ the warming since the preindustrial
77 for the first time. This indicator consistently shows larger changes with respect to the preindustrial (Fig. 1c) than the global
78 mean temperature since 1850 CE (Fig. 1b). It is possible to explore the reasons for this difference (Fig. ??). Firstly, the
79 human population is not distributed evenly over the globe¹⁹, increasing the global average by 0.2 °C. Secondly, urbanisation
80 exposes people to warmer temperatures²², which has a noticeable effect on the global average experienced. The effect of both
81 demographic trends is visible throughout the instrumental record²¹ (Fig. ??).

82 The impact of considering the relative population sizes when thinking about observed temperature changes across the globe
83 are best illustrated through the use of cartograms²⁴. Fig. 5 presents the national average warming since the preindustrial for
84 2016 CE: using (a) area weighting and (b) both exposure-weighting and scaling each country's size relative to its national
85 population. The differing impacts of considering the exposure-weighted and area-weighted averages is most noticeable in
86 North America. The U.S. population has experienced a greater warming than its area average, in part due to its high urban
87 population. Meanwhile Canadians predominantly do not live within the Arctic Circle and so are not exposed to the extreme
88 warming happening there.

89 Natural year-to-year variations can mean there are always regions of the globe that experience temperature at or below the
90 preindustrial, as well as substantially warmer than that (Fig. 2) Nonetheless as the global population crossed 2 billions in the
91 1930s, it also crossed into a world where, for the first time, less people were exposed to a preindustrial climate than a world
92 with warming of 1 °C or higher (Fig. 4). Our analysis shows that 1990 CE was the first year that 50% of the world's population
93 was exposed to 1 °C above preindustrial. Since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 CE, a majority of the world's population
94 has lived in temperatures 1 °C or more above preindustrial (Fig. 4). We find that in 2015 CE over half of the global population
95 was exposed to temperature greater than 1.5 °C above preindustrial (55%, Tab. ??).

96 The Paris Agreement¹ commits us to “pursuing efforts to limit [global average] temperature increase to 1.5 °C”. The
97 ensemble of patterns used to create the preindustrial baseline can also be scaled to represent the regional temperatures associated
98 with various global mean temperatures. This allows estimation of the amount of people that experienced local temperatures
99 equivalent to a global mean temperature rise of 1.5 °C or more each year (Fig. ??). By the time of the Rio Earth Summit in
100 1992 CE, the proportion of the global population experiencing preindustrial conditions was smaller than that experiencing
101 global temperatures above the 1.5 °C goal of the Paris Agreement (Fig. ??). We estimate that in 2015 CE half of world's
102 population experienced annual mean temperatures equivalent to a global warming of 1.5 °C above preindustrial - a third of
103 whom only did so because of urban heat island effects (Tab. ??).

104 The Paris Agreement is highly, yet necessarily, ambitious in its desire to limit temperature to 1.5 °C above preindustrial¹.
105 While the reference to a preindustrial baseline is justifiable, it introduces additional uncertainty into the observed temperature

106 increases^{7, 11, 12}. Having devised a methodology to account for the local expression of this uncertainty, we explore the spatial
 107 pattern of temperature changes from both geographic and demographic perspectives. Most people alive today are unlikely
 108 to have ever experienced preindustrial temperatures, especially given an increasing urban population exposed to urban heat
 109 island effects. Indeed the majority of the world's population has already experienced annual temperatures above 1.5 °C, and the
 110 remainder is likely to experience temperatures equivalent to a 1.5 °C world much earlier than the planet itself. Given the global
 111 population's current exposure to warmer temperatures, it is clear that we should stop thinking of climate change primarily in
 112 the future tense.




Figure 1. Global mean, annual average temperature change. The median, interquartile and 5–95% ranges¹³ with respect to (a) the 1961–1990 CE climatological period and (b) the preindustrial. (c) The average global temperature weighted by exposure²¹ (i.e. population including an urban heat island adjustment). The median, interquartile and 5–95% ranges are shown with respect to the preindustrial [note that the uncertainty range in (c) does not include uncertainty in the population distribution or urban heat island, which are not fully-quantified in the underlying datasets]. The dashed blue line shows the (median) equivalent of a 1.5 °C warmer world derived from the pattern-scaling (see Methods).

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


Figure 2. Spatial patterns of temperature change. (a) The median annual average offset of the preindustrial period from the 1961–1990 CE climatology, along with the interquartile range (green contours) in the offset. (b) The annual temperature of 2016 CE above preindustrial. Cross-hatching indicates regions that are not significantly different from the preindustrial at the 5% confidence level. Stippling shows regions that are at 1.5 °C or higher at the 5% confidence level.




Figure 3. Subdividing global area and population by warming. (a) The proportion of the global area at particular (median) annual temperatures in each year. (b) The population¹⁹ exposed to particular (median) annual temperatures in each year since 1850 CE. The preindustrial and +1.5 °C are indicated by black solid and dashed lines respectively.

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


Figure 4. Exposure to annual mean temperatures. The proportion of the global population exposed to various temperature levels: at or below the preindustrial (blue); +1 °C above preindustrial (green); and +1.5 °C. The thick line shows the annual median value, whilst the thin lines show the 5-year running median temperature estimates along with its interquartile range. The dashed pink line shows the +1.5 °C exposure, without considering the urban heat island. Dotted vertical lines indicate major international commitments to tackle climate change in 1992 CE (Rio), 1997 CE (Kyoto) and 2015 CE (Paris).

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


Figure 5. Two representations of the 2016 annual temperature anomalies at a national level. (a) A conventional cartogram, where a nation is coloured according to its area-averaged temperature anomalies. (b) An exposure-weighted cartogram, where a country's size is determined by its population, and the colour is the exposure-weighted temperature anomaly, incorporating the urban heat island²⁴. Note: Alaska is treated as an independent nation for the purposes of these representations.