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{ "pk": 25568, "title": "Inference of Intention and Permissibility in Moral Decision Making", "subtitle": null, "abstract": "The actions of a rational agent reveal information about its\nmental states. These inferred mental states, particularly the\nagent’s intentions, play an important role in the evaluation of\nmoral permissibility. While previous computational models\nhave shown that beliefs and desires can be inferred from behavior\nunder the assumption of rational action they have critically\nlacked a third mental state, intentions. In this work, we\ndevelop a novel formalism for intentions and show how they\ncan be inferred as counterfactual contrasts over influence diagrams.\nThis model is used to quantitatively explain judgments\nabout intention and moral permissibility in classic and novel\ntrolley problems.", "language": "eng", "license": { "name": "", "short_name": "", "text": null, "url": "" }, "keywords": [ { "word": "moral judgment; social cognition; intention; theory\nof mind; influence diagrams; counterfactuals" } ], "section": "Papers", "is_remote": true, "remote_url": "https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7wq4b79n", "frozenauthors": [ { "first_name": "Max", "middle_name": "", "last_name": "Kleiman-Weiner", "name_suffix": "", "institution": "MIT", "department": "" }, { "first_name": "Tobias", "middle_name": "", "last_name": "Gerstenberg", "name_suffix": "", "institution": "MIT", "department": "" }, { "first_name": "Sydney", "middle_name": "", "last_name": "Levine", "name_suffix": "", "institution": "Rutgers", "department": "" }, { "first_name": "Joshua", "middle_name": "B", "last_name": "Tenenbaum", "name_suffix": "", "institution": "MIT", "department": "" } ], "date_submitted": null, "date_accepted": null, "date_published": "2015-01-01T18:00:00Z", "render_galley": null, "galleys": [ { "label": "PDF", "type": "pdf", "path": "https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/25568/galley/15192/download/" } ] }