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{
    "pk": 28568,
    "title": "A Resource-Rational Mechanistic Approach to One-shot Non-cooperative Games:The Case of Prisoner’s Dilemma",
    "subtitle": null,
    "abstract": "The concept of Nash equilibrium has played a profound rolein economics, and is widely accepted as a normative stance forhow people should choose their strategies in competitive envi-ronments. However, extensive empirical evidence shows thatpeople often systematically deviate from Nash equilibrium. Inthis work, we present the first resource-rational mechanisticapproach to one-shot, non-cooperative games (ONG), show-ing that a variant of normative expected-utility maximizationacknowledging cognitive limitations can account for impor-tant deviations from the prescriptions of Nash equilibrium inONGs. Concretely, we show that Nobandegani et al.’s (2018)metacognitively-rational model, sample-based expected util-ity, can account for purportedly irrational cooperation rates ob-served in one-shot, non-cooperative Prisoner’s Dilemma, andcan accurately explain how cooperation rate varies dependingon the parameterization of the game. Additionally, our workprovides a resource-rational explanation of why people withhigher general intelligence tend to cooperate less in OPDs, andserves as the first (Bayesian) rational, process-level explana-tion of a well-known violation of the law of total probability inOPDs, documented by Shafir and Tversky (1992), which hasresisted explanation by a model governed by classical proba-bility theory for nearly three decades. Surprisingly, our workdemonstrates that cooperation can arise from purely selfish,expected-utility maximization subject to cognitive limitations.",
    "language": "eng",
    "license": {
        "name": "",
        "short_name": "",
        "text": null,
        "url": ""
    },
    "keywords": [
        {
            "word": "One-shot non-cooperative games; Nash equilib-rium; resource-rational process models; expected utility the-ory; behavioral game theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; cooperation"
        }
    ],
    "section": "Papers with Oral Presentations",
    "is_remote": true,
    "remote_url": "https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9dz6h6tn",
    "frozenauthors": [
        {
            "first_name": "Ardavan",
            "middle_name": "S.",
            "last_name": "Nobandegani",
            "name_suffix": "",
            "institution": "McGill University",
            "department": ""
        },
        {
            "first_name": "Kevin",
            "middle_name": "da Silva",
            "last_name": "Castanheira",
            "name_suffix": "",
            "institution": "McGill University",
            "department": ""
        },
        {
            "first_name": "Thomas",
            "middle_name": "R.",
            "last_name": "Shultz",
            "name_suffix": "",
            "institution": "McGill University",
            "department": ""
        },
        {
            "first_name": "A. Ross",
            "middle_name": "",
            "last_name": "Otto",
            "name_suffix": "",
            "institution": "McGill University",
            "department": ""
        }
    ],
    "date_submitted": null,
    "date_accepted": null,
    "date_published": "2019-01-01T18:00:00Z",
    "render_galley": null,
    "galleys": [
        {
            "label": "PDF",
            "type": "pdf",
            "path": "https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/28568/galley/18439/download/"
        }
    ]
}