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{ "pk": 28811, "title": "Decisions Against Preferences", "subtitle": null, "abstract": "An agent decides against her preferences, if she considersan option x better than another option y but neverthe-less decides to do y. A central tenet of rational choi-ce theory states that individuals do not decide againsttheir preferences, whereby we find two kinds of potentialcounterexamples in the literature: akrasia, also known asweak-willed decisions, and decisions based on so-calleddeontic constraints such as obligations or commitments.While there is some empirical evidence that weak-willedchoices are a real phenomenon, leading scholars in phi-losophy of economics debate whether choices based oncommitments can be counter-preferential. As far as weknow, however, nobody so far has tried to settle this de-bate empirically. This paper contributes to both debatessince we present some empirical evidence that (i) akrasiacan also be strong-willed and (ii) choices made on the ba-sis of commitments can indeed be counter-preferential.We will conclude that people can decide against theirpreferences without being unreasonable.", "language": "eng", "license": { "name": "", "short_name": "", "text": null, "url": "" }, "keywords": [ { "word": "Counter-Preferential Choice; RationalChoice Theory; Akrasia; Commitments; Empirical Stu-dies." } ], "section": "Papers with Poster Presentations", "is_remote": true, "remote_url": "https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3d76c6dw", "frozenauthors": [ { "first_name": "Messerli", "middle_name": "", "last_name": "Michael", "name_suffix": "", "institution": "University of Sheffield", "department": "" }, { "first_name": "Reuter", "middle_name": "", "last_name": "Kevin", "name_suffix": "", "institution": "Universitat Bern", "department": "" } ], "date_submitted": null, "date_accepted": null, "date_published": "2019-01-01T18:00:00Z", "render_galley": null, "galleys": [ { "label": "PDF", "type": "pdf", "path": "https://journalpub.escholarship.org/cognitivesciencesociety/article/28811/galley/18682/download/" } ] }