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{
    "pk": 31581,
    "title": "Statutory Interpretation and Chevron Deference in the Appellate Courts: An Empirical Analysis",
    "subtitle": null,
    "abstract": "<p><em>What statutory methods does an appellate court use in reviewing decisions of an administrative agency? Further, in doing this review, are appellate judges more likely to use certain statutory methods when they expressly cite the </em>Chevron<em> two-step framework than if they do not? This Article explores the answers to these questions using an original database of over 200 statutory interpretation cases culled from more than 2,500 cases decided in appellate courts reviewing National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) adjudications from 1994 through 2020. In particular, the study examined the use of text, language canons, substantive canons, legislative history, precedent, policy, and practical considerations. It then compared how use of those methods varied depending on whether or not the appeals court expressly cited or applied </em>Chevron<em>.</em></p>\n<p><em>Most notable was how appellate courts used precedent and policy in contrasting ways when ruling on Board statutory interpretation cases. While precedent was used more when courts reversed the Board’s pro-employee interpretation to reach an anti-employee outcome, courts referenced policy more to uphold Board rulings that were pro-employee in orientation</em>. <em>Both Democrat- and Republican-majority courts exhibited different tendencies in their choice of methods as well.</em>  <em>When ruling on anti-employee interpretations, Democrat-majority courts often cited and relied on text more than Republican-majority courts. In addition, Republican-majority courts disproportionately used substantive canons to uphold anti-employee interpretations while Democrat-majority courts favored language canons when reversing such appeals</em><em>.</em></p>\n<p><em>The study also yielded interesting observations about </em>Chevron<em> deference. Courts citing and applying </em>Chevron<em> had much higher agency-win rates than when </em>Chevron<em> was not used. Courts overwhelmingly cited </em>Chevron<em> or employed a </em>Chevron-<em>like “reasonableness” standard more when they upheld the agency’s statutory interpretation than when they reversed the agency, thus suggesting that courts may use </em>Chevron<em> to cabin judges’ ideological proclivities. The study also revealed a divergence in statutory methods depending on how a court employed </em>Chevron<em>. Courts expressly citing the </em>Chevron<em> two-</em><em>step framework cited and relied on the statutory text and employed language canons more in the writing of the opinion than when they did not speci</em><em>fically cite </em>Chevron<em>. In addition, Republican-majority courts upholding Board interpretations often employed substantive canons more when citing </em>Chevron<em> than when not. </em>Chevron-<em>citing courts also disproportionately invoked policy considerations compared to non-</em>Chevron-<em>citing courts when upholding the Board’s interpretation. Courts declining to cite or apply </em>Chevron<em> at all had different tendencies. Those that declined to cite </em>Chevron<em>, or employ even a similar </em>Chevron<em>-like “reasonableness” standard, were more likely to cite precedent. Substantive canons were also employed to reverse the Board’s interpretation more by courts that declined to apply </em>Chevron<em> than courts that applied </em>Chevron<em> or a </em>Chevron<em>-like reasonableness standard.</em></p>\n<p><em>Although the study is limited to one area of law and to the workings of a single agency—and one of the most politically charged agencies at that—it offers fresh insight into how empirical analysis can be used to look beyond the black box of federal court statutory interpretation and </em>Chevron<em> deference to see what shapes judicial opinions in their review of agency statutory interpretations.</em></p>",
    "language": null,
    "license": {
        "name": "All rights reserved",
        "short_name": "Copyright",
        "text": "© the author(s). All rights reserved.",
        "url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/authors"
    },
    "keywords": [],
    "section": "Article",
    "is_remote": true,
    "remote_url": "https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6m02b8rh",
    "frozenauthors": [
        {
            "first_name": "Amy",
            "middle_name": "",
            "last_name": "Semet",
            "name_suffix": "",
            "institution": "",
            "department": ""
        }
    ],
    "date_submitted": null,
    "date_accepted": null,
    "date_published": "2022-02-01T00:00:00Z",
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}