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{
    "pk": 60213,
    "title": "Are Copyright Firms Incentive Intermediaries?",
    "subtitle": null,
    "abstract": "Copyright scholarship has long condemned the Copyright Term\n \nExtension Act for failing to significantly increase authors' incentive to\n \ncreate. Economic and psychological data combine to suggest that the\n \nincreased reward supplied by the twenty-year term extension is too\n \ntemporally distant to have any effect on individuals' decisions in the\n \npresent. However, a small body of empirical research suggests that\n \nterm extensions do lead directly to some increases in creative production.\n \nThis Comment explores one possible explanation for the discrepancy\n \nbetween theory and practice by distinguishing individual authors\n \nfrom creative firms. Individuals are subject to heuristics that diminish\n \ntheir ability to forecast the future and reduce their valuation of the\n \nterm extension's reward Corporate decisions are not necessarily\n \nguided by such heuristics; consequently, creative firms may be influenced\n \nto produce works of art by different incentives than those that influence\n \nindividuals.\n \n \nTerm extensions may thus provide an incentive for corporate producers\n \neven if their incentive effect for individuals is negligible. This\n \nComment argues that firms, which are more responsive to term extensions,\n \nmay be able to act as incentive intermediaries by passing along\n \nthe greater value of a longer-term copyright. Faced with a more valuable\n \ncopyright term, firms may either pay more for works up-front or\n \nuse the increased profitability to offer additional opportunities for individuals\n \nto sell their works. There is limited evidence showing that\n \nfirms do act this way; instead, it appears that they keep any additional\n \nprofits as windfalls. As a result, society must decide whether incentivizing\n \nfirm authors is as valuable a benefit of legislation as incentivizing\n \nindividual authors.",
    "language": "en",
    "license": {
        "name": "",
        "short_name": "",
        "text": null,
        "url": ""
    },
    "keywords": [],
    "section": "Comments",
    "is_remote": true,
    "remote_url": "https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6w91h40h",
    "frozenauthors": [
        {
            "first_name": "Kelly",
            "middle_name": "",
            "last_name": "Trimble",
            "name_suffix": "",
            "institution": "",
            "department": ""
        }
    ],
    "date_submitted": "2015-04-25T16:17:15Z",
    "date_accepted": "2015-04-25T16:17:15Z",
    "date_published": "2013-01-01T00:00:00Z",
    "render_galley": null,
    "galleys": [
        {
            "label": "",
            "type": "pdf",
            "path": "https://journalpub.escholarship.org/uclalaw_elr/article/60213/galley/46172/download/"
        }
    ]
}